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As Justice Douglas wrote in Skinner v. Oklahoma, procrea-
tion is one of the “basic civil rights of man” and along with mar-
riage it is “fundamental to the very existence and survival of 
the race” and the state’s interference with it threatens to have 
“subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects.”1 And yet the 
United States and other countries regulate a wide range of re-
productive activities such as forbidding anonymous sperm do-
 
 1. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
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nation; funding abstinence education; criminalizing brother-
sister incest; preventing the sale of sperm, eggs, or surrogacy 
services; and forbidding single individuals from accessing re-
productive technologies. In justifying these and countless other 
regulations of reproduction legislatures, courts, and commenta-
tors have relied (at least in part) on an idiom that I call Best 
Interests of the Resulting Child (BIRC); a focus on the best in-
terests of the child who will (absent state intervention) result 
from these forms of reproduction.  
In this Article, one of two papers in a larger project, my 
goal is to reveal and delve into the “secret ambition” of best in-
terests2 discourse in the regulation of reproduction; I aim to 
show that its “real significance” lies “not in what it says but in 
what it stops us from saying,” that is, the way it “takes the po-
litical charge out of contentious issues and deflects expressive 
contention away from” this area of law.3  
My goal is to show that the BIRC idiom is a nonstarter. In-
stead, it is a way of talking about the regulation of reproduction 
that avoids confrontation with justificatory idioms that are dis-
turbing, controversial, and illiberal; idioms that may justify eu-
genics, mandatory enhancement, or other problematic ideas. 
My goal in this Article is to force that confrontation and to 
evaluate the plausibility of four substitute justifications.4 To 
preface my conclusion, because these substitute justifications 
are either implausible or unsettling, they make many if not all 
of these regulations of reproduction unappealing.  
More specifically, this Article makes two main claims. 
First, while the BIRC approach is extremely prevalent as a jus-
tification for regulating reproduction, it is empty and mislead-
ing. Part I of this Article defends that claim. I first briefly set 
the stage by introducing a framework for describing the regula-
 
 2. This is sometimes called child welfare or child-protective, but I will 
just label it “best interests” going forward. 
 3. I borrow this term “secret ambition” from Dan Kahan, who has sought 
to make a similar showing as to the role played by the “deterrence” idiom in 
criminal law. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 413, 416–17 (1999). More precisely, Kahan’s claim is that the “rhetoric of 
deterrence displaces an alternative expressive idiom that produces incessant 
illiberal conflict over status” such that “[c]itizens of diverse commitments con-
verge on the deterrence idiom to satisfy social norms against contentious pub-
lic moralizing; public officials likewise converge on it to minimize opposition to 
their preferred policy outcomes.” Id. 
 4. In this respect my project parts ways from Kahan’s, whose feeling 
about the masking quality of the deterrence idiom is more mixed. See id. at 
477–500. 
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tion of reproduction. I then demonstrate both the prevalence of 
the BIRC justifications in the field and the attraction of this id-
iom from a political theory perspective, and explain why BIRC 
justifications (and reasonable reformulations thereof) are un-
workable. For this last step, I draw on work in bioethics and 
the philosophy of identity to show why it is problematic to say 
that children are harmed if brought into existence with lives 
worth living. I also draw on some parallel legal reasoning from 
the wrongful life tort liability jurisprudence, and show why at-
tempts at reformulating the BIRC approach also fail. This Part 
largely summarizes work I have done in a companion paper, 
Regulating Reproduction: The Problem With Best Interests, 
such that readers familiar with that work may want to skip 
ahead.5 
The remainder of this Article is devoted to a second claim: 
if we go beyond best interests, four possible substitute justifica-
tions for regulating reproduction exist—Reproductive External-
ities, Wronging while Overall Benefitting, Virtue Ethics, and 
Legal Moralism—all of which face considerable problems in 
justifying State intervention. Of the four, I ultimately think 
Reproductive Externalities (the least-discussed of the group in 
the scholarly literature) is the most promising. When properly 
understood, however, even this approach can justify only a 
much narrower swath of regulation of reproduction than cur-
rently exists, such that much of the existing law in this area 
cannot be justified. 
More specifically, Part II considers Reproductive Externali-
ties, wherein the regulation of reproduction is justified not by 
harm to the resulting child (the BIRC justification) but to costs 
that reproduction imposes on third parties. Besides a worri-
some closeness to the eugenics movement of old, such an ap-
proach faces challenges relating to the attenuation of harms 
and how to assess the cost of diffuse harms, underinclusivity, 
the possibility of making parents internalize the externality as 
an alternative solution, and implications for duties to enhance, 
among other obstacles.  
Part III considers a more deontological approach which I 
call Wronging while Overall Benefiting. This approach shifts 
the criterion for moral wrongfulness from harm to a conception 
of wrong absent harm, or to a conception of harm where the 
fact that an individual is overall benefited is insufficient to save 
 
 5. See generally I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem 
with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 423 (2011). 
 2012] BEYOND BEST INTERESTS 1191 
 
the act from being wrongful. I focus on a version of this argu-
ment most tied to legal application developed in the wrongful 
life context by Seana Shiffrin,6 but other versions of this ap-
proach also exist.7 I offer several critiques of Shiffrin’s brilliant 
work. 
Part IV considers two related but distinct justificatory idi-
oms of Legal Moralism—the use of criminal law or other regu-
latory tools to deter acts that neither harm nor offend but un-
dermine public morality, and Virtue Ethics, the view that 
concern over the virtue of the parents making these decisions 
justifies intervention. I suggest that the Legal Moralist ap-
proach is only plausible for a subset of reproductive regulation 
and faces political-theory and constitutional-law hurdles. As to 
the Virtue Ethics approaches, I show how arguments along 
these lines critiquing parental attempts at enhancement of 
their children and sex selection will not serve as a good ground 
for the types of regulations I have discussed. Finally, I conclude 
by suggesting what the regulation of reproduction might look 
like in light of the re-examination I have forced here.  
It is hard to exaggerate the importance of this project: if it 
succeeds, I will have shown that the prevailing justifications 
offered for the regulation of reproduction, and most of the regu-
lations they seek to justify, are either intellectually bankrupt or 
carry with them disturbing and problematic implications such 
that they are better off discarded. While I find the Reproductive 
Externalities approach the most promising, I show that when 
properly understood, even this approach can justify only a 
much narrower swath of regulation of reproduction than cur-
rently exists, such that much of the existing law in this area 
cannot be justified. 
 
 6. See generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procreative Re-
sponsibility, and the Significance of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117 passim 
(1999). 
 7. See, e.g., Dena S. Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to an 
Open Future, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 7 (1997); Carter Dillard, Child Wel-
fare and Future Persons, 43 GA. L. REV. 367 (2009); Elizabeth Harman, Can 
We Harm and Benefit in Creating?, 18 PHIL. PERSP. 89, 93 (2004); F.M. Kamm, 
Baselines and Compensation, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1367, 1385 (2003); James 
Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, 96 ETHICS 804 (1986).  
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I.  THE PROBLEM WITH BEST INTERESTS: A 
FRAMEWORK; A JUSTIFICATORY IDIOM; AND A 
PROBLEM   
In this Part, I begin by briefly setting out a framework for 
discussing the regulation of reproduction. I then explain how 
one particular type of justificatory idiom, what I call Best In-
terests of the Resulting Child (BIRC), is relied upon by courts, 
legislators, and scholars, in part because it is attractive from a 
political theoretical perspective. However, I show that the idi-
om is problematic for reasons akin to those recognized in the 
wrongful life tort jurisprudence and by the philosopher Derek 
Parfit’s “Non-Identity Problem.” I also briefly discuss how 
tempting reformulations of the BIRC argument are non-
starters. All this, which captures work I have done in a com-
panion Article,8 serves as a prelude to the main contribution of 
this Article: to show why the BIRC justificatory idiom is vacu-
ous and to plumb what really lies beneath it. 
A. FRAMEWORK: THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF STATE 
INTERVENTIONS AIMED AT INFLUENCING REPRODUCTION 
As in the companion Article, Regulating Reproduction, I 
find it useful to describe State attempts to influence reproduc-
tion through a taxonomy with three dimensions, one to which I 
will return throughout the Article. 
The first dimension is the target reproductive decision (or 
simply “target” for short) the State seeks to influence. For our 
purposes we can crudely distinguish three such targets: wheth-
er, when, and with whom individuals reproduce.9  
Programs that sterilize the severely mentally ill or deny 
access to reproductive technologies to those over age fifty affect 
whether these individuals will reproduce. Abstinence education 
aims to delay reproduction by teenagers or other unmarried in-
dividuals and thus influences when individuals reproduce. Pro-
hibitions on brother-sister incest, programs aimed at carrier 
screening for Tay-Sachs or other heritable genetic disorders, 
and statutes barring sperm donor anonymity attempt to influ-
ence with whom individuals reproduce.  
 
 8. See generally Cohen, supra note 5, at 423 (2011).  
 9. For other purposes the “how” dimension—for example, whether to 
permit cloning as a form of reproduction—may also matter, but not for the ex-
amples I discuss. 
 2012] BEYOND BEST INTERESTS 1193 
 
The second dimension goes to the means by which the State 
seeks to influence the target decisions (“means” for short). These 
interventions can roughly be ordered from strongest to weakest 
in terms of their level of intrusion. Physical alteration is the 
most intrusive, for example, sterilization of the severely mental-
ly retarded. Criminal prohibition is also extremely intrusive, 
for example, making it a crime to engage in brother-sister in-
cest or to purchase surrogacy services. Less intrusively, the 
State may make certain status determinations immutable (par-
ticularly as to parentage) and/or make contracts surrounding 
reproduction unenforceable; for example, California treats ges-
tational surrogacy contracts (where the surrogate carries the 
fetus to term but does not contribute the egg for fertilization) as 
enforceable, but not traditional surrogacy contracts (where the 
surrogate is both the genetic mother and carries the fetus to 
term).10 More weakly, the State may also create default status 
determinations and set the altering rules, for example, the older 
version of the Uniform Parentage Act still in place in many ju-
risdictions absolves a sperm donor of parental responsibilities 
only if the recipient was married and the procedure was done 
through a licensed physician, thereby setting conditions to 
overcome a default parentage rule.11 Still less intrusively, the 
State may selectively fund certain types of reproductive assis-
tance—in the United States a number of states use state-level 
insurance mandates to force insurers to cover in vitro fertiliza-
tion (IVF; an extremely expensive procedure), but use them se-
lectively to fund only particular types of reproduction through 
language limiting it to married individuals, thus excluding sin-
gle individuals and gays and lesbians.12 An even less intrusive 
intervention is informational, for example, the State’s funding 
of abstinence education or public health campaigns encourag-
ing carrier testing for Tay-Sachs and other heritable genetic 
disorders.  
The third dimension goes to the justification or, more often, 
justifications that are, or could be, offered in favor of these in-
terventions (“justification” for short). At a high and somewhat 
crude level, it is useful to distinguish four different families of 
 
 10. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783–84 (Cal. 1993); In re 
Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 900–01 (Ct. App. 1994).  
 11. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b), 9B U.L.A. 377, 408 (1973). 
 12. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen & Daniel L. Chen, Trading-Off Reproductive 
Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and 
Should it Matter?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 485, 502 n.83, 536–40 (2010). 
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justifications: (1) the Harm Principle, tracing back to Mill, sug-
gesting that prevention of harm to others is a justification for 
state action;13 (2) Paternalism, the argument that the preven-
tion of harm to the actor herself—usually calling on some con-
ception of false consciousness or bounded rationality—is a justi-
fication for State action; (3) Wronging Without Harming, the 
argument that preventing the wronging (usually in a deonto-
logical sense) of another, even if one does not harm him, is a 
justification for state action; finally, (4) Moralism and Virtue, 
suggesting that though a particular action causes neither harm 
to the actor nor to third-parties, its negative effects on public 
morality generally or the virtue/character of individual actors is 
a justification for state action.14  
For our purposes, it is useful to further subdivide the 
Harm Principle form of justification to distinguish between 
claims of harm to the children resulting from reproductive deci-
sions (the BIRC justification) and claims of harm to other third-
parties (a reproductive externalities justification I discuss to-
ward the end of this Article).  
The three dimensions and their elements are summarized 
in Table 1 and can be used to describe many regulations of  
reproduction. 
For example, abstinence education is aimed at influencing 
when individuals reproduce (target), does so through infor-
mation provision (means), and is typically justified based on a 
Harm Principle rationale targeting the interests of the children 
who will result from teenage pregnancy as well as legal moral-
ism aimed at discouraging premarital sex (justification), 
though other forms of justification are also possible. Prohibitions 
on sperm donor anonymity influence with whom individuals re-
produce (target), through criminal prohibition (means), and are 
typically justified through a Harm Principle rationale targeting 
the interests of the children who will result ( justification). 
As is often the case in the fractal world of legal analysis, 
things can get much more complex, but for present purposes 
these three dimensions are a useful starting point, and I will 
 
 13. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) 
(1859) (“That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.”). 
 14. Cf. JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM 
TO OTHERS 26–27 (1984) (developing a much fuller taxonomy of justifications 
for criminal law interventions).  
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only add additional layers of complexity as needed.15 While I 
have designed this taxonomy for this project and its aims, I also 
think the taxonomy is very useful on its own. 
 
Table 1:  
Three Dimensions of Regulation Reproduction 
 
 
 15. To wit, I briefly discuss distinctions as to the severity of the reproduc-
tive interests that are being stymied—for example, a governmental interven-
tion that prevented you from having an eighth genetically related child when 
you already had seven might be viewed quite differently than an intervention 
that prevented you from having any genetically related children, and short de-
lays in the timing of reproduction might be thought of as less severe than 
longer ones. See, e.g., Dan W. Brock, Shaping Future Children: Parental 
Rights and Societal Interests, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 377, 380 (2005); I. Glenn Cohen, 
The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1194 (2008); 
Daniel Statman, The Right to Parenthood: An Argument for a Narrow Inter-
pretation, 10 ETHICAL PERSP. 224, 227–28 (2003). One could also draw an ad-
ditional prior distinction between State attempts to influence the reproduction 
of others (the focus of this Article) versus attempts by other individuals (for 
example, charities offering voluntary sterilization programs for poor women).  
1. Target Reproduction Decision 
a. When One Reproduces 
b. Whether One Reproduces 
c. With Whom One Reproduces 
2. Means By Which the State Influences Reproduction (ordered from 
most to least intrusive) 
a. Physical Alteration 
b. Criminal Prohibition 
c. Immutable Status Determination 
d. Unenforceability of Contract 
e. Default Status Determination 
f. Selective Funding 
g. Information Provision 
3. Justification Offered for Intervention 
a. Harm Principle 
i. Harm to Child (Best Interests of Resulting Child) 
ii. Harm to Third Parties (Reproductive Externalities) 
b. Paternalism 
c. Moralism and Virtue (Especially Legal Moralism) 
d. Wronging Without Harming 
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B. JUSTIFICATORY IDIOM: BEST INTERESTS OF THE RESULTING 
CHILD JUSTIFICATIONS, THEIR ATTRACTION AND PROMINENCE 
1. The Prominence of BIRC: Some Examples 
In a large set of areas, the Best Interests of the Resulting 
Child (BIRC) idiom has been a prominent (indeed in some cases 
the predominant) justification used to defend policies that in-
fluence when, whether, and with whom we reproduce. In this 
Section I concentrate on seven examples that I will return to 
throughout this Article. In a companion paper I have demon-
strated this reliance with exhaustive quotations and citations,16 
so here I just briefly set out the categories with only one or two 
examples of that reliance.  
Criminalizing Brother-Sister and First Cousin-First 
Cousin Incest Between Adults: Brother-sister and cousin 
incest is still illegal in many U.S. states, and a similar ban was 
recently upheld in England in a case involving siblings who 
were adopted into separate families as children.17 “The most 
commonly cited rationale for prohibiting consensual relations is 
that incestuous relationships have the potential to create chil-
dren with genetic problems if the parties reproduce,”18 a perfect 
illustration of a BIRC justification. The reason is that in an in-
cestuous coupling there is a higher likelihood that both part-
ners will carry the same recessive gene, thus increasing the 
likelihood of genetic abnormalities from a two-to-three percent 
risk rate of severe abnormalities in non-consanguineous rela-
tionships to between a thirty-one and forty-four percent risk of 
severe abnormalities for sibling sexual relationships.19 Scholars 
like Naomi Cahn have accepted the BIRC justification for these 
rules in principle, with some concerns as to over-inclusivity 
prompting them to argue for more narrowly tailored versions of 
these rules.20 
 
 16. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 429–45. 
 17. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:78 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. 
LAW § 3-323 (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-702, 28-703 (2008); Naomi 
Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing The Line—Or The Curtain?—For Reproduc-
tive Technology, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 59, 61, 89 (2009).  
 18. Jennifer M. Collins et al., Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U. L. REV. 
1327, 1391 (2008). 
 19. Cahn, supra note 17, at 85.  
 20. E.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope 
Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary 
Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1570 (2005); 
Cahn, supra note 17, at 86–87. 
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Abstinence Education/Funding: The U.S. government 
has spent more than $1.5 billion to promote abstinence-only 
education in a series of programs, and among the conditions of 
receiving that funding is that the program “teaches that bear-
ing children out-of-wedlock is likely to have harmful conse-
quences for the child.”21 This same BIRC justification is also 
apparent in support for these programs by conservative com-
mentators.22 
Reproductive Technology Access Restrictions by 
Age, Marital Status, Sexual Orientation: Countries like 
Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Greece, Japan and the Aus-
tralian states of Western Australia, South Australia, and Victo-
ria, have put in place restrictions on access to reproductive 
technology requiring that users be below a certain age, mar-
ried, and/or heterosexual.23 These restrictions are often prem-
ised on BIRC-type concerns, for example, the Italian parlia-
ment’s concern with “avoiding psycho-social damage to the 
child,” and the U.K. Act’s requirement that “a woman shall not 
be provided with treatment services unless account has been 
taken of the welfare of the child who may be born as a result of 
the treatment.”24  
 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 710(b)(2) (2006); BONNIE SCOTT JONES & MICHELLE 
MOVAHED, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, LESSON ONE: YOUR GENDER IS YOUR 
DESTINY—THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TEACHING SEX STEREOTYPES IN AB-
STINENCE-ONLY PROGRAMS 3–4 (2008), available at http://www.acslaw.org/ 
files/Jones%20-%20Movahed%20Issue%20Brief.pdf. 
 22. See, e.g., Patrick F. Fagan, How Broken Families Rob Children of 
Their Chances for Future Prosperity, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, June 
11, 1999, No. 1283 available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/ 
BG1283.cfm. 
 23. E.g., Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) s 8 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/hist_act/ita1995264.pdf; Human Repro-
ductive Technology Act 1991 (WA) ss 4, 23(c) (Austl.), available at http://www 
.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/hrta1991331/index.html#s23; Reproduc-
tive Technology Act 1988 (SA) ss 10(b), 13(3)(b) (Austl.), available at www 
.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/ASSISTED%20REPRODUCTIVE%20TREATME
NT%20ACT%201988/2000.07.05_(1996.08.01)/1988.10.PDF; Nomos (2002: 
3089) [Medically Assisted Human Reproduction], Official Gazette of the Hel-
lenic Republic 2002, 1:1455 (Greece), available at www.bioethics.gr/media/ 
pdf/biolaw/human/law_3089_en.pdf; DEP’T OF HEALTH, REVIEW OF THE HU-
MAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY ACT, 2006, Cm. 6989, at 9 (U.K.) avail-
able at http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/ 
documents/digitalasset/dh_073065.pdf; Rachel Anne Fenton, Catholic Doctrine 
Versus Women’s Rights: The New Italian Law On Assisted Reproduction, 14 
MED. L. REV. 73, 84–89 (2006); Rachel Brehm King, Redefining Motherhood: 
Discrimination in Legal Parenthood in Japan, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 189, 
214–15 (2009).  
 24. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 23; Fenton, supra note 23, at 88. The 
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While no U.S. state currently bans Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (ART) use by aged, single or lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
or transsexual (LGBT) individuals, state legislatures have re-
cently introduced bills to do so.25 U.S. access restrictions in-
stead primarily take the form of physician self-regulation, with 
groups like the American Society for Reproductive Medicine—
whose 1997 policy statement suggests that “postmenopausal 
pregnancy should be discouraged,” and treating physicians 
should carefully consider not only threats to the woman’s 
health or that of the child, but also “the provision for child rear-
ing . . . [b]ecause parenting is both an emotionally stressful and 
physically demanding experience, older women and their part-
ners may be unable to meet the needs of a growing child and 
maintain a long parental relationship,” and because “children 
could resent having mothers old enough to be grandmothers 
and be adversely affected psychologically and socially.”26 The 
American College of Pediatricians’ has a similar position state-
ment from 2004 on LGBT access to reproductive technology.27  
 
HFE Act of 2008 recently liberalized that policy by omitting the words “includ-
ing the need of that child for a father” after legislators decided that the re-
quirement discriminated against single mothers and lesbians, however the 
“duty . . . to consider the welfare of the child who may be born as a result of 
treatment . . . or any other child who may be affected,” has been retained. 
Rachael Dobson, UK Parliament Rejects the ‘Need for a Father’ in IVF Treat-
ment, PROGRESS EDUC. TRUST, June 3, 2008, available at http://www.ivf.net/ 
ivf/uk-parliament-rejects-the-need-for-a-father-in-ivf-treatment-o3427.html. 
 25. At the present moment these bills do not seem to be moving forward. 
See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barri-
ers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 44–46 (2008) 
(citing H.B. 187, 2006 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006)); Mary Beth 
Schneider, Assisted-Reproduction Bill Dropped, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 6, 
2005, at B2. U.S. states achieve similar ends through more subtle means such 
as limiting the enforceability of surrogacy agreements to cases where the 
commissioning couple is legally married, limiting insurance mandates cover-
ing IVF to cases of married heterosexual individuals, and absolving sperm do-
nors of legal parenthood responsibilities only when the recipient is married. 
E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1) (West 2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 
§ 160.754(b) (West 2008); JESSICA ARONS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FUTURE 
CHOICES: ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 8 (2007), 
available at www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/12/pdf/arons_art.pdf; Co-
hen & Chen, supra note 12, at 539; Daar, supra, at 46; John A. Robertson, Gay 
and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 323, 356 (2004). 
 26. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Oocyte Donation to Postmenopausal Wom-
en, 67 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2S–3S (1997). 
 27. Michelle Cretella & Den Trumbull, Homosexual Parenting: Is It Time 
For Change?, AM. C. PEDIATRICIANS, http://www.acpeds.org/homosexual 
-parenting-is-it-time-for-change.html ( last updated Jan. 2012). 
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Scholars arguing on both sides of the issue have also set-
tled on BIRC as the proper idiom in which to debate these re-
strictions. For example, Radhika Rao suggests that “[t]he gov-
ernment could limit the use of ARTs in order to prevent 
physical, psychological, or social harms to the participants or 
the resulting children” as it does in adoption,28 and admits that 
deficits to a child in being raised in a single or LGBT household 
could constitute such harm (although she doubts this claim’s 
empirical bona fides).29 On the other side, Lynn Wardle claims 
that unmarried and LGBT individuals’ use of reproductive 
technologies harms children by “depriving a child of contact 
with one of his or her parents.”30  
Parental Fitness Screening: Other scholars have pro-
posed requiring parental fitness screening for reproductive 
technology, akin to that which occurs in child adoption, prem-
ised on BIRC concerns. For example, Debora Spar, now Dean of 
Columbia University’s Barnard College, notes that the best in-
terests rationale controlling adoption “could easily be extended 
into the realm of assisted reproduction, even if only to scruti-
nize procedures that are known to carry extensive risks to the 
child . . . .”31 Similarly, Marsha Garrison has argued that 
“[l]ogically, if regulation of adoption is constitutionally permis-
sible to safeguard the interests of the adoptive child, her biolog-
ical parents, and would-be adoptive parents, so is regulation of 
reproductive technology aimed at protecting the various actors 
involved and any children that might be produced.”32 She en-
dorses reproductive technology regulation justified by “child-
 
 28. Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and 
Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1479 (2008). 
 29. Id. at 1476–77; see also NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY 
THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL REGULATION 168 (2009) (summarizing 
the conservative argument that the law should “encourage two parents, one of 
each sex, for every child”). 
 30. Lynn D. Wardle, Global Perspective on Procreation and Parentage by 
Assisted Reproduction, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 413, 444–51 (2006); see also Camille 
S. Williams, Planned Parent-Deprivation: Not in the Best Interests of the Child, 
4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 375, 376 (2005) (“[G]iven the importance 
of shared familial history and kinship to individual identity, and the im-
portance of both maternal and paternal involvement in the development of 
children, intentionally depriving a child of one parent will surely wound the 
child in a multitude of ways.”). 
 31. Debora L. Spar, As You Like It: Exploring the Limits of Parental 
Choice in Assisted Reproduction, 27 LAW & INEQ. 481, 491 (2009). 
 32. Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1623, 1627 (2008). 
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protection aims.”33 These recommendations have some uptake 
in regulations in the Netherlands and the Australian state of 
Victoria requiring criminal background checks as a precondi-
tion for IVF usage and screening out those who exhibit psycho-
pathologies.34 In the United States, the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine recommends screening out those with 
uncontrolled psychiatric illness, a history of child or spousal 
abuse, or drug abuse,35 and survey data of ART clinics in the 
U.S. suggests that these screening recommendations have often 
been adopted.36  
Anonymous Sperm Donation: Austria, Germany, Swit-
zerland, the Australian states of Victoria and Western Austral-
ia, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and Swit-
zerland have all banned anonymous sperm donation, in many 
cases relying on concerns about the welfare of children born 
without access to their father’s identity—that is, a BIRC rea-
son.37 Scholars considering the question like Mary Lyndon 
 
 33. Id. at 1642; see also Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: 
An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 835, 854–59 (2000).  
 34. See J.A.M. Hunfeld et al., Protect the Child from Being Born: Argu-
ments Against IVF from Heads of the 13 Licensed Dutch Fertility Centres, Eth-
ical and Legal Perspectives, 22 J. REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOL. 279, 280–88 
(2004) (examining arguments in the Netherlands for withholding IVF treat-
ment from special patient groups); Richard F. Storrow, The Bioethics of Pro-
spective Parenthood: In Pursuit of the Proper Standard for Gatekeeping in In-
fertility Clinics, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2283, 2291 (2007) (discussing IVF laws in 
the Netherlands); Mixed Response to Victoria’s Law Change, ABC NEWS (Dec. 
5, 2008, 5:44 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-12-05/mixed-response-to 
-victorias-ivf-law-changes/230976 (reporting on Victoria’s background-check 
requirement); see also Daar, supra note 25, at 67 (“Basing a physician’s ability 
to deny ART services on his or her prediction about the child-rearing abilities 
of a prospective parent is speculative and leaves too much opportunity for 
masking pure discrimination with concern for offspring.”); Ethics Comm. of 
the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Child-Rearing Ability and the Provision of 
Fertility Services, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY 564, 565 (2004) (arguing that fer-
tility programs should be permitted to deny fertility services when there is a 
“substantial basis for such judgments”); Judy E. Stern et al., Access to Services 
at Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics: A Survey of Policies and Practic-
es, 184 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 591, 596 (2001) (discussing the pol-
icy of some clinics to deny access to patients they think would make problem-
atic parents). 
 35. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 34, at 567. 
 36. See Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of 
Assisted Reproductive Technology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61, 
61–65 (2005). 
 37. See Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act of 2004 § 4(a), (e) 
(N.Z.); Ken Daniels & Alison Douglass, Access to Genetic Information by Donor 
Offspring and Donors: Medicine, Policy and Law in New Zealand, 27 MED. & 
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Shanley, Ellen Waldman, and Naomi Cahn have similarly fo-
cused on a BIRC analysis of donor anonymity.38 
Sperm/Egg Donor and Surrogate Compensation: 
Britain, Canada and the Australian states of Victoria and New 
South Wales have banned or limited compensation for egg and 
sperm donation beyond expenses incurred.39 Canada, the Aus-
tralian states of Victoria and Western Australia have made 
commercial surrogacy a crime, as have the U.S. states of New 
York, Michigan, Washington, and the District of Columbia.40 
Great Britain de facto prohibits commercial surrogacy by for-
bidding the transfer of parentage rights from the surrogate to 
the intended parents absent “a showing before the court that 
the surrogate received no financial or other beneficial consider-
 
L. 131, 134 (2008); Christopher De Jonge & Christopher L. R. Barratt, Gamete 
Donation: A Question of Anonymity, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 500, 500 
(2006); Michelle Dennison, Revealing Your Sources: The Case For Non-
Anonymous Gamete Donation, 21 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 8–10 (2008); Lucy Frith, 
Gamete Donation and Anonymity: The Ethical and Legal Debate, 16 HUM. 
REPROD. 818, 818–20 (2001); Ilke Turkmendag et al., The Removal of Donor 
Anonymity in the UK: The Silencing of Claims by Would-Be Parents, 22 INT’L 
J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 283, 283–84 (2008); Can You Be Anonymous as a Sperm, 
Egg or Embryo Donor?, HUM. FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY, 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/1973.html ( last visited Jan. 22, 2012). 
 38. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of 
Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 682–88 (2008); Cahn, supra note 17, at 73–74; 
Mary Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and Commodification in Assisted Pro-
creation: Reflections on an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in Human 
Sperm and Eggs, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 257, 268 (2002); Ellen Waldman, What 
Do We Tell the Children, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 517, 520–32, 533–55 (2006). Of 
course, the term “donation” is a bit of a misnomer since in almost all instances 
the individuals are paid. Still, I use “donation” because it is the more common 
term. 
 39. See Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) s 23 (Austl.); Assist-
ed Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, § 7(1) (Can.); HUMAN FERTILISA-
TION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., SPERM, EGG AND EMBRYO DONATION (SEED) RE-
PORT 14 (2005) (UK), available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/SEEDR 
eport05.pdf; Michelle Bercovici, Biotechnology Beyond the Embryo: Science, 
Ethics, and Responsible Regulation of Egg Donation to Protect Women’s 
Rights, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 193, 205–06 (2008); Press Release, Human 
Fertilisation & Embryology Auth., HFEA Confirms UK Position on Payment 
for Egg Donors (Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/784.html. 
 40. See D.C. CODE §§ 16-401 to -402 (LexisNexis 2001) (punishing both 
commercial and altruistic surrogacy); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.859 
(West 2002); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123(1) (McKinney 1999); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.210–.260 (West 2005); Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) 
s 59 (Austl.); Surrogacy Act 2008 (W. Austl.) pt 2 div 2 ss 8–9 (Austl.); Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, § 6(1) (Can.); Ailis L. Burpee, Note, 
Momma Drama: A Study of How Canada’s National Regulation of Surrogacy 
Compares to Australia’s Independent State Regulation of Surrogacy, 37 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 305, 310–20 (2009). 
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ation in exchange for her services as a surrogate . . . .”41 The 
U.S. states of Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska, New Mexico and 
Oregon render commercial surrogacy contracts unenforceable.42  
Although much of the literature on prohibiting (or limiting) 
compensation for egg (and, much less frequently, sperm) dona-
tion focuses on concerns relating to what I have elsewhere 
termed coercion—the voluntariness of the decision to partici-
pate due to monetary inducement, a form of Legal Paternalism 
justification under Part I’s taxonomy—and corruption argu-
ments focused on commodification,43 a number of authors such 
as Martha Ertman, Elizabeth Anderson, and Kenneth Baum, 
have considered BIRC justifications relating to harm to chil-
dren from being “purchased.”44 
Enforcement of Surrogacy Agreements: In a similar 
vein, both courts (most famously in Baby M45 and Johnson v. 
Calvert46) and scholars such as Richard Epstein47 have consid-
 
 41. Ruby L. Lee, New Trends in Global Outsourcing of Commercial Surro-
gacy: A Call for Regulation, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 275, 287 (2009); see 
also HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., supra note 39. 
 42. See Darra L. Hofman, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s Maybe:” A State-by-
State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 449, 456–59 (2009).  
 43. Note, The Price of Everything, the Value of Nothing: Reframing the 
Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689, 689–90 (2003). I discuss the-
se corruption arguments below under the rubric of Legal Moralism. See infra 
Part IV.A. 
 44. Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong With a Parenthood Market? A New 
and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 33 (2003); see al-
so, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women’s Labor a Commodity, 19 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 71, 75–77 (1990); Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Ra-
tional Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001 BYU L. REV. 107, 156.  
 45. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1988) (“Worst of all, however, 
is the contract’s total disregard of the best interests of the child” in that 
“[t]here is not the slightest suggestion that any inquiry will be made at any 
time to determine the fitness of the Sterns as custodial parents, of Mrs. Stern 
as an adoptive parent, their superiority to Mrs. Whitehead, or the effect on the 
child of not living with her natural mother”).  
 46. 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993) (“[A]s Professor Shultz recognizes, the 
interests of children, particularly at the outset of their lives, are ‘[un]likely to 
run contrary to those of adults who choose to bring them into being.’ Thus, 
‘[h]onoring the plans and expectations of adults who will be responsible for a 
child’s welfare is likely to correlate significantly with positive outcomes for 
parents and children alike.’” (quoting Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive 
Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutral-
ity, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 397)); id. at 799–800 (Panelli, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that prior contractual agreements as to surrogacy should be ignored and 
parentage determined purely by inquiry as to which potential parent would 
serve the best interests of the children).  
 47. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case For Full Contractu-
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ered the potential harm to children from being the subject of an 
enforceable surrogacy agreement as a potential reason not to 
enforce those agreements, while statutes in several state man-
date an adoption-style parental fitness evaluation of potential 
surrogates based on best-interests concerns before surrogacy 
agreements will be enforced.48 To be sure, the BIRC strand of 
reasoning does not dominate this discourse, but instead is usu-
ally offered alongside paternalistic arguments.49 
 
al Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2321 (1995); see also Vanessa S. Browne-
Barbour, Bartering For Babies: Are Preconception Agreements in the Best In-
terests of Children?, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 429, 484 (2004) (arguing that pre-
conception arrangements “constitute baby selling and should be prohibited” 
due to concern for the welfare of the resulting children).  
 48. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16 to 18 (LexisNexis 2010); 
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 803(b)(2) (2000) (amended 2002) (requiring that for 
judicial pre-approval of a surrogacy agreement, inter alia, “unless waived by 
the court, the [relevant child-welfare agency] has made a home study of the 
intended parents and the intended parents meet the standards of suitability 
applicable to adoptive parents.” (alteration in original)). 
 49. Legal Paternalism in the regulation of reproduction is the view that 
the State can justifiably intervene in an individual’s reproductive decisions in 
order to protect that same individual. In this instance, the State knows what 
is better for the individual than the individual does. Typically, such argu-
ments portray the individual as suffering from bounded rationality or false 
consciousness, and he will actually be ‘harmed’ if allowed to pursue his desired 
path.  
While I have analyzed this form of justification elsewhere in my work on 
reproduction, see, e.g., Cohen, supra note 15, at 1161–96, I largely put it to one 
side here for a few reasons. First, unlike BIRC itself and most of the justifica-
tory idioms I discuss (Legal Moralism may actually share this feature), its ap-
plication is largely distinct from concerns about child welfare. Legal Paternal-
ism may justify intervening in reproductive decisions that produce children 
with very high welfare, and it may leave untouched reproductive behavior that 
produces children with very low welfare. In other words, unlike the other 
views I canvas, Legal Paternalism does not present itself as a true BIRC-
substitute and is instead often a separate kind of justification. Second, for re-
lated reasons, Legal Paternalism seems to me plausible only in a few of the 
examples of reproductive regulations I have discussed above—abstinence edu-
cation and surrogacy contracting in particular—but unlike a justification such 
as Reproductive Externalities it has less general application. Finally, while my 
views sometimes skew in a libertarian direction, I do not believe that the State 
is always forbidden as a matter of principle from regulating on Legal Paternal-
ism grounds. Instead, I believe that such regulation demands careful case-by-
case analysis of the underlying behavioral law and economics data, and the 
costs and benefits of regulation. See Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports: 
Medical Tourism and the Patient-Protective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 
1523–59 (2010); Cohen, supra note 15, at 1161–96. Thus, if I have succeeded 
in this Article on casting doubt on many of the justifications one could offer for 
regulating reproduction, Legal Paternalism remains unscathed here, but sub-
ject to case-by-case scrutiny going forward. 
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2. The Attraction of BIRC Justifications and the Family 
Privacy Analogy 
As the mapping in the prior section suggests, the BIRC 
form of justification for regulation of reproduction focuses on a 
Millian Harm Principle and applies it to a particularly vulner-
able group—children who result from reproduction. From a po-
litical theory perspective, this idiom is a very attractive way to 
justify state interference with reproductive decision-making be-
cause that interference is supposedly justified by preventing 
harm to society’s most vulnerable—children.50 Harm Principle 
arguments are typically accepted even by libertarians as a 
proper justification for liberty-limiting government regulation, 
including criminal sanctions.51 Further, with harm to children 
arguments there are no issues of consent or contributory fault, 
and as a matter of human psychology, the suffering of children 
is a particularly potent call for action. Thus, BIRC is an attrac-
tive justificatory idiom because it relies on relatively uncontro-
versial premises that permit an overlapping consensus between 
otherwise divergent comprehensive moral theories, such as 
welfarism, libertarianism, etc.52 
 
 50. To be precise, in some usages what is called “best interests” actually 
exceeds that which is prohibited by the Harm Principle. Richard Storrow has 
captured a similar point nicely, explaining that “although exposing children to 
serious harm is of necessity inconsistent with their best interests, what is not 
best for a child does not necessarily harm the child.” Storrow, supra note 34, at 
2300–01. Are the types of cases I discuss in this Article harm-prevention or 
benefit-conferral? To ask the question demonstrates the baseline problem we 
face, a point I return to in discussing enhancement below. Nevertheless, be-
cause my goal is to defeat the application of best interests reasoning in this 
context, I want to be as generous as possible to my interlocutor. Therefore, for 
present purposes I will grant that all interventions justified on BIRC reason-
ing that I discuss can benefit from the political theoretical cover of the Harm 
Principle, even though I think the point is arguable. As a terminological mat-
ter it might be more precise to describe the Harm Principle as a commitment 
to the view that harm to others is the only basis for justifying the State’s abil-
ity to limit liberty, but in what follows I will write more loosely about going 
“beyond” the Harm Principle versus sticking to it. 
 51. See, e.g., MILL, supra note 13, at 91. 
 52. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 144 (expanded ed. 
2005). Of course, even the command “protect children from harm” may not 
forge a complete overlapping consensus in that it may require subscription to 
particular concepts of what constitutes “harm,” for example whether being 
born deaf harms a child or instead enables them to be a participant in deaf 
culture. See I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Prob-
lem, and Legal Liability, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 347, 349–50 (2008). But the BIRC-
approach, if it were valid, would certainly be able to forge much more of an 
overlapping consensus than many of the views I canvass below. 
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BIRC is also an attractive justificatory idiom because it can 
draw on a parallel idiom in family law as to the importance of 
Best Interests of Existing Children, one of the central organiz-
ing principles of family law. Although it is sometimes called 
child welfare or harm prevention, I will just use Best Interests 
from here on out. This idiom has origins in the United States 
going back to at least the 1830s.53 For example, in determining 
child custody in a divorce proceeding, many states suggest that 
the best interest of the child is to be considered, with thirty-five 
states listing the welfare of the child as the sole consideration.54 
Many state statutes have a presumption that the legal parent 
will have visitation rights with the child even when they are 
the noncustodial parent but that the court may terminate those 
rights on a showing that the child’s welfare would be seriously 
endangered.55 In adoption, the state investigates potential 
adopters, qualifying some and disqualifying others, to ensure 
that allowing the adoptive parents to become the parents of the 
child is in the child’s best interests.56 Despite constitutional law 
protecting parents’ right to raise their child in their faith, reli-
giously motivated refusal of needed treatment for the child will 
be overruled when the activity endangers a child’s life, and in 
some jurisdictions if it endangers the child’s health as well.57  
In these and other family law settings’ the central model is 
the same: “[t]he state appropriately steps in, as parens patriae 
protector of the welfare of these non-autonomous persons, to 
act in their behalf, choosing for them” when their welfare is 
threatened by parental action.58 From a political theory per-
 
 53. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 
653 (2006) (citing MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND 
THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 241 (1985)); Lynne Marie 
Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child Standard in 
American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 337, 347–50 (2008). 
 54. See James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in 
State Decision Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
845, 907–11 (2003) (collecting statutes).  
 55. Id. at 932–34 nn.253–54 (collecting statutes).  
 56. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-308(b) (2002); see also 
Dwyer, supra note 54, at 881–904 (surveying existing adoption law by state). 
 57. See Kei Robert Hirasawa, Note, Are Parents Acting in the Best Inter-
ests of Their Children When They Make Medical Decisions Based on Their Re-
ligious Beliefs?, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 316, 317–24 (2006) (collecting cases and his-
tories); Laura M. Plastine, Comment, “In God We Trust”: When Parents Refuse 
Medical Treatment for Their Children Based Upon Their Sincere Religious Be-
liefs, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 123, 142 & n.79 (1993). 
 58. James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States’ Continued Con-
signment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407, 411 (2008). 
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spective, the best interests justification is a very powerful one, 
overruling what would otherwise be a forbidden state intrusion 
into the private realm of family decision-making.  
One way of understanding the prominence of BIRC justifi-
cations for the regulation of reproduction, then, is as transposi-
tion of reasoning from family law into the law of reproduction. 
The analogy goes: protecting the best interests of existing chil-
dren is to the constitutional protections against interference in 
child rearing and legal parenthood (family autonomy) as pro-
tecting the best interests of resulting children is to the consti-
tutional protections against interference in reproductive deci-
sions (reproductive autonomy). Both are constitutionally 
protected spheres where the state is usually restrained from in-
terfering, but where such interference is nevertheless justified 
in order to protect child welfare.59  
To be a little more precise, on the existing child side, Su-
preme Court decisions like Meyer v. Nebraska,60 Pierce v. Socie-
ty of Sisters,61 Prince v. Massachusetts,62 and Wisconsin v. 
Yoder63 all recognize a broad family autonomy principle protect-
ing parents’ child-rearing decisions but also the need to subor-
dinate family privacy when there are serious threats to child 
welfare. They offer though two different strands supporting 
this principle. The predominant strand ties it to child vulnera-
bility: children are at the mercy of the parents, walled off from 
the assistance of any other agents of protection and socializa-
tion but for State intervention.64 This strand connects the pro-
tection of children to the protection of other vulnerable popula-
tions such as mentally incompetent adults, with the State 
stepping in as parens patriae.65 The second, more subordinate 
 
 59. Cf. Dov Fox, The Illiberality of ‘Liberal Eugenics’, 20 RATIO 1, 5 (2007) 
(summarizing the argument that the discretion afforded to parents to shape 
their existing offspring through praise, blame, and other means ought to ex-
tend to genetic manipulation).  
 60. 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). 
 61. 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
 62. 321 U.S. 158, 165–66 (1944). 
 63. 406 U.S. 205, 221–22, 230–34 (1972). 
 64. See, e.g., Helen M. Alvaré, Gonzales v. Carhart: Bringing Abortion 
Law Back Into the Family Law Fold, 69 MONT. L. REV. 409, 415–16 (2008) (ar-
guing this jurisprudence reflects the Lockean premise that “children are self-
evidently vulnerable, particularly relative to adults, and require special solici-
tude and protection” and that “[p]arents have the first duty and first right to 
shield their vulnerable children; if they fail, the state may intervene on the 
children’s behalf ”). 
 65. Dwyer, supra note 58. 
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strand treats protecting child welfare as instrumentally good in 
ensuring future citizens capable of participating in a democrat-
ic society. We can call these two the vulnerability and social 
planning strands, respectively.  
Once the social planning strand is excavated from the opin-
ions, we can also see the Court’s attempt to set some limits: 
Meyer notes that the State would exceed its power if it tried to 
enact the vision of the Ideal Commonwealth from Plato’s Re-
public—where all children are reared collectively, no child 
knowing which is his or her parent and no parent knowing 
which is his or her child, and society invests in the children of 
“good parents,” while “the offspring of the inferior, or of the bet-
ter when they chance to be deformed” are hidden away—or the 
practice in ancient Sparta of assembling boys at age seven and 
entrusting their subsequent education and training to official 
guardians rather than parents, opining that no “[l]egislature 
could impose such restrictions upon the people of a state with-
out doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitu-
tion.”66 Yoder distinguishes Prince by arguing that unlike that 
case or prior decisions, this was not a circumstance “in which 
any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the 
public safety, peace, order, or welfare has been demonstrated or 
may be properly inferred.”67 The Court notes that “the power of 
the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be 
subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that parental 
decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or 
have a potential for significant social burdens.”68  
As to existing children, the vulnerability and social plan-
ning strands operate largely in tandem in that the State inter-
venes to protect children from, for example, an abusive home 
environment because the child is vulnerable and because fail-
ure to do so will result in a child who cannot appropriately car-
ry the mantle of citizen. In the realm of regulating reproduc-
 
 66. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,401–02 (1923). Although the opinion 
does not cite The Republic, the episode and the quotations can be found in 
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. 5, at 457–60. 
 67. 406 U.S. at 230; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) 
(recognizing that while the state can interfere to protect best interests, there 
is a “presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children”); 
Prince, 321 U.S. at 173, 175 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (accepting that “shielding 
minors from the evil vicissitudes of early life” is important, but finding that 
the state’s failure to show the “bare possibility that such harms might” occur 
to the child in this circumstance was insufficient). 
 68. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233–34 (emphasis added). 
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tion, however, the two strands pull apart conceptually. I argue 
in Part II that the Reproductive Externalities approach is 
grounded in this social planning strand, but that much of the 
discourse regarding regulating reproduction masks that strand 
by problematically using the language of best interests. 
C. THE PROBLEM WITH BIRC 
As I have said, there is a logical problem with attempts to 
have best interests reasoning play a limiting role in reproduc-
tive autonomy analogous to its role limiting family autonomy. 
The problem is that in the latter context there is an appeal to 
the best interest of the existing child while in the reproductive 
context the appeal is actually to best interest of the resulting 
child. Whenever the proposed intervention will itself determine 
whether a particular child will come into existence, best inter-
est arguments premised on that child’s welfare are problematic. 
This point is at the core of the “Non-Identity Problem” de-
veloped by Derek Parfit, a problem that has been the subject of 
a great deal of philosophical attention since the publication of 
Parfit’s Reasons and Persons in 1984.69 The punch line of the 
problem is that we cannot be said to harm children by creating 
them as long as we do not give them a life not worth living.70 A 
life not worth living is a life so full of pain and suffering, and so 
devoid of anything good, that the individual would prefer never 
to have come into existence. As I have demonstrated in Regu-
lating Reproduction, this insight renders problematic any at-
tempt to use BIRC reasons to justify a regulation of reproduc-
tion that will alter when, whether, or with whom individuals 
reproduce—such a regulation cannot be said to be in the best 
interests of the resulting child because a different child will  
result.71  
 
 69. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 358–59 (rev. ed. 1987); see, 
e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUS-
TICE 224–25 (2000); Dan W. Brock, The Nonidentity Problem and Genetic 
Harms—The Case of Wrongful Handicaps, 9 BIOETHICS 269 (1995). For an in-
depth treatment in the context of access to reproductive technologies, see John 
A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduc-
tion, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2004). For my own discussion of the problem in the 
context of tort liability for intentionally creating children with disabilities, see 
generally Cohen, supra note 52 (arguing to bar tort liability for creating disa-
bled children when it is done by selection). 
 70. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 69, at 233; JOEL FEINBERG, HARM 
TO OTHERS 98–104 (1984); Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 118.  
 71. Cohen, supra note 5, at 457. 
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The easiest version of the problem to see involves regula-
tion of whether individuals reproduce, for example, the denials 
of access to reproductive technology to LGBT, aged, or single 
parents. Imagine that sixty-year-old Ethel wants to have a ba-
by through reproductive technology and assume arguendo that 
this child, Maxwell, will be worse off (physiologically, psycho-
logically, etc.) than would the average child born to a woman in 
her twenties. We cannot say that a state law preventing Ethel’s 
access to reproductive technology at her age furthers the wel-
fare of Maxwell, because if the State blocks that access Max-
well will never exist and, so long as he has a life worth living, 
coming into existence does not harm him. Thus, any state in-
tervention influencing whether individuals reproduce (absent 
lives not worth living)72 cannot be justified by BIRC reasoning. 
A similar problem extends to attempts to influence when 
and with whom individuals reproduce. Parfit’s primary discus-
sion of this problem in Reasons and Persons is that of a four-
teen-year-old girl who has a child and gives it a bad start in life 
by not waiting to have a child until she is older. As he notes, 
“We cannot claim that this girl’s decision was worse for her 
child. What is the objection to her decision? This question aris-
es because, in the different outcomes, different people would be 
born.”73 Thus, here too the usual (what Parfit calls person-
affecting) conception of harm assumed by the BIRC argument 
cannot be the basis for justifying attempts to alter when indi-
viduals reproduce—such as state funding of teenage abstinence 
programs or implanting of Norplant or other temporary forms 
of birth control in women convicted of multiple counts of drug 
possession.74 A similar logic applies to interventions regulating 
 
 72. From here on I stop repeating the proviso “absent lives not worth liv-
ing” but intend it to be implied throughout. 
 73. PARFIT, supra note 69, at 359. 
 74. To be clear, in the cases I am discussing in this Article, the delay has 
to be one as to when sperm and egg meet. Compare that to a different delay: a 
husband and wife fertilize pre-embryos as part of IVF at Time 1, but choose to 
implant the pre-embryo either at Time 1 + 1 year, or after cryopreservation at 
Time 1 + 5 years. In many of my examples, the regulation influencing when 
and with whom we reproduce will also change other facets of an individual’s 
life—like the date on which he or she is born or who his or her rearing parents 
are—that might also be thought to alter identity in the relevant sense. While I 
do not think these additional facts are necessary to produce a Non-Identity 
Problem (i.e., it is enough for a different sperm-egg combination to occur), I 
leave open the question of whether they might nonetheless be sufficient to do 
so in some cases even if the same sperm meets the same egg. If they were suf-
ficient, a still-wider swath of the regulation of reproduction might be subject to 
the Non-Identity Problem, for example, rules regarding the enforcement of 
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with whom individuals reproduce, for example, the criminaliza-
tion of adult brother-sister (or first cousin-first cousin) incest in 
the United States and many foreign countries.  
At this juncture it is worth clarifying that none of this de-
pends on any assumption that children are harmed if they are 
not brought into existence. Instead, I share with others the 
view that “no one is harmed in not being created, because there 
is no one to be harmed if we do not create someone.”75 Thus, ac-
cepting this insight in no way implies a conclusion that parents 
do wrong by failing to have the largest number of children they 
can or that they harm a particular child by failing to create the 
child.76 All it entails is that no one is harmed by being created if 
he or she is given a life worth living.77 I emphasize this point, 
because it is common source of confusion. 
In one respect, the whether case is an easier one for ruling 
out BIRC justifications than the with whom case, and especial-
ly the when case, because in these latter cases the claim de-
pends on the assumption that changing which sperm meets 
which egg—that is changing which child, genetically speaking, 
is conceived—is sufficient to produce a Non-Identity Problem 
that rules out BIRC justifications. This is a relatively weak as-
sumption. It does not require subscription to a strong form of 
genetic essentialism—the view that your genes determine who 
you are—but is instead entirely compatible with the view that 
given a certain complement of genes you could become any 
number of different kinds of people from the point of view of 
what philosophers sometimes call narrative identity.78 Genetic 
identity does not ensure narrative identity—identical twins 
share the same genes but are different people. Thus, it is also 
not a claim about identity and lack thereof in all senses of the 
word. It is the weak claim that if we want to know whether the 
person that results from the particular sperm and egg combina-
tion would be harmed, we cannot say that it would further the 
 
pre-embryo disposition agreements that may alter when pre-embryos are im-
planted. See generally Cohen, supra note 49. 
 75. F.M. Kamm, Cloning and Harm to Offspring, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 65, 72 (2000–2001). 
 76. It is at least possible that this conclusion may be entailed by one of the 
competitor views to BIRC as a justification of regulating reproduction, the 
non-person-affecting principle approach. Cohen, supra note 5, at 481–513. 
 77. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 78. David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics, THE STANFORD EN-
CYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta et al. eds., rev. ed. Mar. 5, 2008), http:// 
plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics/. 
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welfare of that person if we instead substituted a different 
sperm and egg combination. Philosophers often refer to this as 
“numerical identity”; two entities are not the same because 
there are two of them.79 
To put it tangibly: my mother was married once, without 
children, before she had me with her second husband. Imagine 
we concluded (counterfactually I hope!) that on the day of my 
conception she had instead conceived with her first husband; 
the resulting child—call him Gabriel—would have been health-
ier or in other ways had a better life than I did. All the Non-
Identity Problem requires accepting is that if we want to know 
whether my life harms me (i.e., is Glenn harmed by being alive) 
it would be wrong to compare Glenn’s life to the life Gabriel 
would have lived. That comparison might be relevant for some 
other purposes—indeed the non-person-affecting principle ap-
proach I discuss in Part III focuses on it—but is not relevant to 
the question of whether Glenn has been harmed by being born. 
I believe Parfit is right on this issue of alterations of when or 
with whom we reproduce, and in what follows I will examine 
the consequences for the law.80  
I have also purposefully restricted my canvas in this Arti-
cle to cases where the State seeks to influence who will be con-
ceived, not who will be born, to bracket (for present purposes) 
three additional more controversial questions. The first ques-
tion concerns whether Non-Identity Problems can result from 
genetic manipulations of early embryos, and which kinds of 
manipulations—an issue I have discussed in other work con-
cerning tort liability for parents who use reproductive technol-
 
 79. Harold Noonan, Identity, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Ed-
ward N. Zalta et al. eds., rev. ed. Nov. 7, 2009), available at http://plato 
.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/identity/ (“To say that things are iden-
tical is to say that they are the same. ‘Identity’ and ‘sameness’ mean the same; 
their meanings are identical. However, they have more than one meaning. A 
distinction is customarily drawn between qualitative and numerical identity or 
sameness. Things with qualitative identity share properties, so things can be 
more or less qualitatively identical. Poodles and Great Danes are qualitatively 
identical because they share the property of being a dog, and such properties 
as go along with that, but two poodles will (very likely) have greater qualita-
tive identity. Numerical identity requires absolute, or total, qualitative identi-
ty, and can only hold between a thing and itself.”). 
 80. For those who remain unpersuaded, my analysis of regulations on 
“whether” individuals can reproduce that cover many of the interventions dis-
cussed above should still matter, since it does not rely on this tie between 
genes and identity. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 445–71. How the Non-Identity 
Problem interfaces with religious views of ensoulment I leave to religious 
scholars and self-consciously do not address here. 
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ogies to purposefully create children with disabilities; these 
cases raise the further question of whether genetic manipula-
tions rather than changing conception can give rise to Non-
Identity Problems.81 The second question concerns the interplay 
between Non-Identity Problems and the abortion right, a case I 
believe requires a quite different analysis: On the one hand, 
while no one is harmed if not conceived, on some views of fetal 
personhood the fetus may be harmed if aborted, creating a di-
vergence from my cases. On the other hand, for some writers 
that defend the abortion right as a right not to be a gestational 
parent that is tied to bodily integrity, that right exists irrespec-
tive of fetal person such that this divergence may be irrele-
vant.82 Thus, my analysis here does not necessarily cut in any 
direction on the abortion debate, except to render more prob-
lematic a small strand of reasoning occasionally presented that 
parallels BIRC by defending the abortion right on the basis of 
harm to children of growing up unwanted or out-of-wedlock.83 
The third question relates to regulation of multiple gestation, 
made (in)famous by the “Octomom” news coverage.84 There are 
many complications here—indeed one might conclude that 
some of the multiple gestating pre-embryos are harmed while 
others are not85—but for this Article I stick to simpler cases, 
 
 81. In a symposium issue in which we participated, Kirsten Smolensky 
argued that such manipulations never can create Non-Identity Problems, 
Kirsten Smolensky, Creating Children With Disabilities: Parental Tort Liabil-
ity for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 331–36 
(2008), while I have argued against that conclusion, Cohen, supra note 52, at 
350–59.  
 82. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 15, at 1132; Judith Jarvis Thomson, A De-
fense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 48–49 (1971) (grounding a defense of 
abortion in the thought experiment of waking up one morning to find a world-
famous violinist connected to your vital organs without your  
permission). 
 83. That strand is one way to read the passage in Roe v. Wade noting that 
“[t]here is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted 
child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, 
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.” 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 84. See, e.g., Camille M. Davidson, Octomom and Multi-Fetal Pregnancies: 
Why Federal Legislation Should Require Insurers to Cover In Vitro Fertiliza-
tion, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 135, 137–38 (2010). 
 85. To hum only the first few bars of a very complex set of questions: first 
imagine a woman is deciding how many of six pre-embryos to implant at once. 
If we knew that the prevailing legal rule would cause her to implant all six at 
once or each of the six seriatim, one might not think there is a Non-Identity 
Problem since the same six (genetically speaking) children will come into ex-
istence, the only question is whether they will suffer the deficits of womb shar-
ing or not. Even this conclusion will depend on the issue alluded to above, su-
 2012] BEYOND BEST INTERESTS 1213 
 
which as we will see are not nearly as simple as they might  
appear. 
At this juncture some readers might react: “That is philo-
sophically fascinating, but it seems like an interesting puzzle 
that would never motivate judges or other legal actors.” To the 
contrary, the Non-Identity Problem insight has been implicitly 
accepted by the vast majority of courts that have rejected 
wrongful life tort liability for similar reasons. To give but one 
example, in Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court rejected the child’s ability to bring a 
wrongful life suit because it was “reluctant to find that the in-
fant has suffered a legally cognizable injury by being born with 
a congenital or genetic impairment as opposed to not being 
born at all” and  
  [r]ecognition of a cause of action for wrongful life in this case 
would therefore require this court to find [the child] had an interest in 
avoiding his own birth, i.e., that there is a fundamental legal right not 
to be born when birth would necessarily entail a life of hardship
86
 
which the Siemieniec court was not prepared to do.87  
 
pra note 74, of whether changes in sperm-egg combination are only sufficient 
or actually necessary to produce a Non-Identity Problem. Contrast this with a 
case where the legal rules adopted to regulate multiple gestation will cause 
the prospective mother to either implant all six pre-embryos at once, or only 
implant two pre-embryos seriatim (due to cost or some other reason). Now 
there is no Non-Identity Problem as to the two that would have been implant-
ed either way, but there may be a Non-Identity Problem as to the four whose 
implantation depends on the prevailing legal rule. Actually, on some views 
about whether fertilized pre-embryos are harmed by not being implanted, the 
answer here might depend on whether the prevailing legal rule alters how 
many pre-embryos are implanted versus how many are fertilized to begin 
with. Finally, contrast these two cases with still another case where multiple 
gestation occurs due to the use of a fertility drug, and but-for the use of the 
fertility drug all the fetuses that come into being would be the result of differ-
ent sperm-egg combinations. Here it seems as though the Non-Identity Prob-
lem affects all of the fetuses and thus supports the claim that the fertility drug 
should be banned due to harm to these children. This is merely a taste of the 
complexities involved in reasoning about the Non-Identity Problem in the mul-
tiple gestation context, one of the reasons I put it to one side in this Article 
since it deserves its own separate analysis elsewhere. 
 86. 512 N.E.2d 691, 697, 698 (Ill. 1987) (citations omitted). 
 87. Id.; see also, e.g., Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984) 
(“Thus, the cause of action unavoidably involves the relative benefits of an im-
paired life as opposed to no life at all. All courts, even the ones recognizing a 
cause of action for wrongful life, have admitted that this calculation is impos-
sible. . . . [T]his is not just a case in which the damages evade precise meas-
urement. Here, it is impossible to rationally decide whether the plaintiff has 
been damaged at all.”). 
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The fact that courts, legislatures, and commentators have 
accepted the implications of the Non-Identity Problem in one 
area of the law but through BIRC discourse have entirely ig-
nored it elsewhere may be further evidence of the “secret ambi-
tion” of best interests discourse—the choice of a palatable but 
ultimately vacuous way of talking about regulating reproduc-
tion that forestalls confrontation with the controversial premis-
es that lie beneath. 
D. ATTEMPTS AT REFORMULATING BIRC ARGUMENTS ARE 
UNAVAILING 
As I have argued in-depth in Regulating Reproduction, 
three tempting attempts to reformulate the BIRC argument so 
as to avoid the problem raised by Parfit and recognized by the 
wrongful life jurisprudence are unavailing.88 
Because BIRC reasoning is only problematic for cases that 
produce children with lives not worth living, I first consider 
whether we might still be able to use BIRC reasoning to justify 
the state interventions discussed above by arguing that if left 
unchecked these reproductive activities would indeed create a 
life not worth living.89 Unfortunately, with the possible excep-
tion of the genetic abnormalities stemming from brother-sister 
incest (and even there it is dubious), I show that none of the 
lives created absent these interventions can plausibly result in 
a life not worth living.90 These would have to be lives of nega-
tive utility, where existing is worse for the individual than not 
existing.91 Even if not a null set, I have argued that this set is 
vanishingly small, perhaps encompassing only truly awful dis-
eases like Tay Sachs and Lesch Nyhan syndrome but not much 
(if anything) else.92 
 
 88. Cohen, supra note 5, at 471–513.  
 89. Id. at 472–74. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 473. 
 92. Infants with the incurable Lesch-Nyhan syndrome begin (at approxi-
mately 6 months of age) a process of neurological and physiological deteriora-
tion involving athetosis (involuntary writhing movements), severe mental de-
ficiencies, and a tendency towards compulsive self-mutilation often requiring 
placing the child’s elbows in splints, wrapping her hands in gauze, and some-
times extracting all her teeth. See, e.g., ROBERT F. WEIR, SELECTIVE 
NONTREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS 48–49 (1984). Tay-Sachs has its 
onset in infancy and leads to “progressive retardation in development, paraly-
sis, dementia (mental disorder), blindness, cherry-red retinal spots, and death 
by age three or four years.” 5 ATTORNEYS’ TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 17.21(3) 
(Roscoe N. Gray & Louise J. Gordy eds., 3d ed. 2000). 
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The second reformulation draws a distinction between 
what I have labeled perfect and imperfect Non-Identity Prob-
lems and suggests that BIRC reasoning is only problematic for 
the perfect cases.93 In perfect cases—including the examples 
discussed above of criminalizing brother-sister adult incest, ab-
stinence education funding, and access restrictions to reproduc-
tive technology—BIRC-reasoning is self-contradictory because 
the policy, if effective, will necessarily alter when, whether, and 
with whom one reproduces, thereby creating a Non-Identity 
Problem. By contrast, in imperfect cases—such as the interven-
tions discussed above aimed at prohibiting sperm donor ano-
nymity, making surrogacy agreements unenforceable, or pro-
hibiting of payment for gamete donation or surrogacy 
services—it is theoretically possible that the policy can be suc-
cessful while not altering whether, when or with whom some-
one reproduces, but in reality is very unlikely to do so, since if 
any of those alterations take place the Non-Identity Problem 
will apply. While perfect Non-Identity Problems make BIRC-
type justifications for policies nonsensical, imperfect Non-
Identity Problems will sharply reduce the number of children 
for whom the BIRC-type reasoning can be invoked in favor of a 
given intervention. For example, for sperm donor anonymity, 
the choice of whether to permit or prohibit donor anonymity is 
very likely to alter which children come into existence, and 
while there is chance that the exact same sperm donor provides 
the exact same sperm to the exact the exact same recipient, and 
that the fertilization occurs at the exact same time it would 
have in an anonymity-permitted regime, the probabil-
ity/number of resulting children for whom this is likely to be 
true is extremely small. I show that at least as to these exam-
ples, concerns about this small probability of harming a small 
number of children cannot justify these restrictions.94 It re-
quires accepting burdening the liberty of large swaths of the 
population to protect an extremely small number of potential 
children in a way that is in tension with our rejection of a simi-
lar approach as to the best interests of existing children.95  
A third reformulation adapts proposals by philosophers 
(most prominently Parfit himself and Dan Brock) who suggest 
that the wrongfulness of these reproductive acts stems not from 
harming the children that result but from the failure to pro-
 
 93. Cohen, supra note 5, at 474–76. 
 94. Id. at 477–81. 
 95. Id. at 476. 
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duce children who suffered less or had more opportunity, an 
outcome that is wrong from a non-person-affecting vantage 
point, at least in certain cases.96 This is referred to as the “non 
person-affecting principle” approach.97 Elsewhere, I have dis-
cussed several reasons why this approach will not succeed: it 
cannot support the full gamut of programs for which BIRC is 
usually invoked because it appears limited cases where the 
same-number of children will exist whether or not the interven-
tion is put in place, and we merely substitute the higher for 
lower welfare person;98 it is problematically underinclusive as 
to the categories of reproduction it seeks to regulate;99 it carries 
disturbing implications as to enhancement and eugenics;100 and 
on a political theoretical level it may not provide a valid basis 
for criminalizing reproductive conduct or invading bodily  
integrity.101 
  * * *   
BIRC and its reformulations fail. Where do we go from 
here? We face two possible choices: the first is to accept that 
these interventions are unjustified. The second is to drop the 
fig leaf of BIRC, and delve into the secret ambition of best in-
terests arguments pertaining to regulating reproduction, the 
task of the remainder of this Article. I believe there are four 
families of potential frameworks that might sustain the regula-
tory interventions described above—Reproductive Externali-
ties, Wronging While Overall Benefitting, Legal Moralism, and 
Virtue Ethics—but each of these holds problems I discuss be-
low. In any event, as I hope to make clear, using any of these 
approaches requires a move away from the comfortable (albeit 
false) overlapping consensus between comprehensive moral 
theories that BIRC arguments offer and requires instead adopt-
ing more contestable premises. Throughout, I consider how 
these arguments might justify some modes of intervention (e.g., 
informational, funding) but not others (e.g., bodily integrity in-
fringements, criminalization). 
 
 96. Id. at 481–85. 
 97. Brock, supra note 69, at 273. 
 98. Cohen, supra note 5, at 485–93. 
 99. Id. at 494–96. 
 100. Id. at 496–504. 
 101. Id. at 504–12. 
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II.  REPRODUCTIVE EXTERNALITIES   
A. REPRODUCTIVE EXTERNALITIES AND AN ANALOGY TO BEST 
INTERESTS OF EXISTING CHILDREN REGULATION 
The Non-Identity Problem is an obstacle for any attempt to 
justify state intervention by claiming that the child who would 
be produced absent the intervention is harmed. An approach I 
call Reproductive Externalities suggests we merely need to 
change our specification of the victim of the harm. Yes, the re-
sulting child cannot be harmed if these interventions are not 
put in place for the reasons set out by the Non-Identity Prob-
lem, but third parties may be harmed by this child’s existence.  
Indeed, as I suggested above, one might find an analogue 
to this approach in the Supreme Court cases countenancing in-
terference with family privacy in the name of protecting the 
best interests of existing children: while the child vulnerability 
strand has become more prominent as the basis for interven-
tion, there is also a strand suggesting it can be justified by 
third party interests in selecting for citizenship that I call the 
social planning strand.  
To be sure, these cases are not a perfect match for our con-
text; they directly regulate only one way in which parental be-
havior might jeopardize the interests of third parties: “[W]hen 
parental behavior might make these children unable to partici-
pate politically.” While one or two of the reproductive acts the 
State has targeted (discussed above) may produce that kind of 
political participation deficit if left unchecked—increased risks 
of genetic abnormalities from brother-sister incest is the inter-
vention most likely to do so—most of the targeted reproductive 
behavior seems unlikely to produce children incapable of the 
mantle of citizenship.  
There is also a disanalogy between the two contexts in the 
way the parties are configured. In the family privacy cases the 
parents’ interest lies in opposition not only to the State’s inter-
est but also to the existing child’s interest (in becoming capable 
of political participation) as well. By contrast, in reproductive 
regulation cases parental liberty and state interests are poten-
tially in opposition, but (because of the Non-Identity Problem) 
we cannot say the child will be harmed if the State’s interests 
do not trump. There are other differences—interference in rear-
ing might be thought of as more or less noxious an interference 
with liberty than interventions of the kind we have been dis-
cussing. But at the very least, the analogy suggests we should 
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take seriously the possibility of justifying interventions based 
on setbacks to the interests of third parties.  
Reproductive externalities might take several forms: One 
version is intrafamilial, wherein the intervention is urged not 
to benefit the resulting child but to benefit other children of the 
potential parent who already exist. For example, a claim that 
parents over a certain age should not be allowed to reproduce 
because the resulting child will likely suffer from impairments 
due to the advanced maternal age and will remove resources 
from its already-existing siblings. Such a claim allows the State 
to recapture some of the political theoretical capital of BIRC—it 
retains a Harm Principle justification focused on a particularly 
vulnerable population, children, but just focuses on other  
children.  
However, the intra-familial variant faces several draw-
backs as an adequate substitute for BIRC. First, it can only jus-
tify a much smaller set of regulation of reproduction—it re-
quires that there be other children in the family already 
existing for it to operate, which in many of the proposed regula-
tions is unlikely to be the case. Second, it is quickly subject to a 
reductio ad absurdum counterargument as to underinclusivity 
in ways I will discuss below.  
Accordingly, I instead focus on a more domain-general form 
of Reproductive Externalities—the idea that the birth of certain 
children will lead to cost-type externalities to third-parties 
within a State, and that these externalities might serve as a 
justification for the kinds of interventions discussed in Part I.  
At first glance, this version appears to capture many of the 
usages of BIRC-type reasoning that justify the regulations of 
reproduction we have discussed. Even if we cannot say the re-
sulting child is harmed because of the Non-Identity Problem, 
the same deficits that are foisted on the child might count as 
reasons why fellow taxpayers are harmed if they are forced to 
pay for them. These costs are most tangible as to cases involv-
ing the imposition of disabilities (as the term is used colloquial-
ly) from genetic abnormalities stemming from brother-sister in-
cest. The public fisc may have to pay for some costs here—for 
example, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA) requires the federal government to fund state and local 
agencies to ensure “appropriate” education for the disabled “to 
 2012] BEYOND BEST INTERESTS 1219 
 
meet their unique needs.”102 Title II of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (ADA) forbids state and local governments from 
denying to a “qualified individual with a disability” participa-
tion in or the benefits of “the services, programs, or activities of 
a public entity,” for instance, by requiring a state courthouse to 
have an elevator.103 Resulting disabilities may also place bur-
dens on private employers, for example, under the accommoda-
tions requirements of Title III of the ADA.104  
Indeed, in some cases a form of the externalities argument 
is already being offered alongside a BIRC type argument. For 
example, for programs that receive abstinence education fund-
ing under either the Maternal and Child Health Services Block 
Grants or the CBAE block grants, the programs must teach ad-
olescents “that bearing children out-of-wedlock is likely to have 
harmful consequences for the child, the child’s parents, and so-
ciety.”105 In such cases one tangible contribution of my work is 
to show that the BIRC argument—if it must be recast in this 
way to be coherent—will add nothing as a justification, since 
the BIRC justification is already being improperly offered to 
support those programs in addition to the Reproductive Exter-
nalities approach. 
The bigger contribution, though, is to show that there are 
several problems with embracing Reproductive Externalities as 
a substitute for BIRC justifications: (1) the harms involved are 
quite attenuated; (2) there is significant underinclusivity as to 
what forms of reproduction are regulated; (3) the approach may 
justify government-enforced enhancement; (4) the approach 
does not adequately grapple with the possibility of positive ex-
 
 102. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 
179–84 (1982) (identifying the conditions of the Education of the Handicapped 
Act); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3d 816, 820–21 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(describing rights under the IDEA). 
 103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12132 (2006); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 
509, 513–18 (2004) (discussing the ADA’s requirements in this regard and up-
holding the constitutionality of the ADA against an Eleventh Amendment  
attack).  
 104. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
527 U.S. 471, 477–79 (1999) (describing ADA applicability to private airlines); 
cf. Eric Rakowski, Who Should Pay for Bad Genes, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 
1382 (2002) (“Defenders of the person-affecting restriction note that many 
people, including potential parents, siblings, insurers, insurance purchasers, 
and public officials and the taxpayers they represent, will be worse off if a 
child is born disabled when a different child might have been born without the 
disability. Ordinarily, their interests alone will justify spending on preconcep-
tion or intrauterine screening programs.”). 
 105. 42 U.S.C. § 710(b)(2); JONES & MOVAHED, supra note 21, at 4. 
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ternalities; (5) the approach faces complications as to valuing 
new lives that may limit its applicability to same number sub-
stitutions; (6) on the logic of this approach it may be better to 
force parents to internalize reproductive externalities rather 
than to prevent or discourage reproduction, and (7) the ap-
proach may depend on eugenic premises we find objectionable. 
I set out these problems one-by-one in the rest of this Part. 
Nevertheless, as I explain below, once we have seen the availa-
ble alternatives I will argue that this justification for regulat-
ing reproduction—the one given the least attention in the 
scholarly literature—is the best of a not very good lot. While 
the Reproductive Externality approach seems like the best way 
forward to justify regulating reproduction, given its problems 
and limitations it can justify only a much more narrow swath of 
regulation than that which currently exists. 
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE REPRODUCTIVE EXTERNALITIES 
APPROACH 
1. Attenuation of Externalities and the Harm Principle 
While, as discussed, genetic abnormalities that may result 
from brother-sister adult incestual reproductive sex and possi-
bly advanced maternal age can give rise to externalized costs of 
a predictable and measurable sort,106 the other interventions 
discussed in Part I produce much more attenuated and specula-
tive externalities. In some cases, for example, sperm donor an-
onymity and the prohibition on commercialized surrogacy or 
the enforcement of surrogacy agreements, the link between the 
deficits experienced by children and the cost externalities 
seems strained. Consider regulation to prevent access to repro-
ductive technologies for single or LGBT parents. Most of the 
(extremely contested) studies suggesting some impairment 
 
 106. According to one facility, the risk of Down syndrome increases from 1 
in 952 to 1 in 30 as maternal age increases from 30 to 45 years of age if the 
patient is using her own eggs, but reduces to the 30 year old risk level if the 
egg provider is 30 years old. Advanced Maternal Age, CAL. IVF, 
http://www.californiaivf.com/AMA.htm ( last visited Apr. 18, 2012). Thus, older 
women who reproduce with younger women’s eggs do not pose increased risk. 
Id. If advanced maternal age is also paired with advanced paternal age or 
there is no supporting father, there is also the possibility of externalized costs 
in the case of death before the child reaches the age of majority, in which case 
the child may become a ward of the state, but that is likely in only a very 
small fraction of cases. Moreover, there will be significant underinclusivity 
problems in that many parents with shorter than average life expectancies re-
produce in ways the law does not seek to prevent.  
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from being raised in a single parent family focus on things like 
cognitive development, likelihood to complete high school, alco-
hol and drug use, and gender role assumption.107 Even if these 
things had a likely negative impact on the child’s welfare (the 
problematic BIRC argument), their impact on social welfare, 
especially from the point of view of cost externalities, is less 
clear; the impact of the potential harm to the child seems to 
lose force as it diffuses through all of the facets of social life, 
until it feels more like a whimper when we get to the question 
of cost externalities. 
All things being equal, is it bad if, for example, children 
have worse rather than better cognitive development, and does 
that really impose costs on society? In one very attenuated 
sense it does—perhaps there is a higher probability that chil-
dren who end up with lower IQs will eventually contribute less 
to the tax base, require more resources in public schools, or be 
more prone to incarceration. But, if the Harm Principle is to 
have any bite as a serious liberal limit on interventions that re-
strict liberty, such small and speculative externalities seem 
problematic when used as justifications.108 As Feinberg has not-
ed in the criminal context, whether a Harm Principle argument 
is persuasive as a basis for limiting liberty depends in part on 
the gravity of the harm that will result, its probability, the val-
ue of the conduct that is being prohibited, and the importance 
of the underlying interest which will be thwarted by the inter-
vention.109 Here it would seem many of these considerations cut 
 
 107. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the 
Emerging Law of Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 861–65 (2005) 
(collecting studies); Holly J. Harlow, Paternalism Without Paternity: Discrimi-
nation Against Single Women Seeking Artificial Insemination by Donor, 6 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 173, 198–203 (1996) (collecting studies). 
 108. Cf. Epstein, supra note 47, at 2325 (observing, in regard to “soft ex-
ternalities” (such as corruption of society’s view of women’s sexuality) from 
contractualized commercial surrogacy that “John Stuart Mill’s classic state-
ment that the sole justification for restricting individual liberty is the preven-
tion of harm to others is wholly gutted if the conception of harm is given a 
meaning as broad as that supposed in this context”). 
 109. FEINBERG, supra note 14, at 187–217; see also Robertson, supra note 
69, at 18 (“[M]any of the conditions of concern involve questions of relative 
well-being, and may not themselves impose such significant costs on others as 
to justify limitation of a person’s reproductive plans in order to avoid them.”). 
But see Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 183 (1999) (“Once non-trivial harm arguments have 
been made, we inevitably must look beyond the harm principle. We must look 
beyond the traditional structure of the debate over the legal enforcement of 
morality. We must access larger debates in ethics, law and politics—debates 
about power, autonomy, identity, human flourishing, equality, freedom and 
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against the regulation. Even if one does not accept the extreme 
position that procreative liberty is of central (indeed trumping 
constitutional) concern,110 it is beyond cavil that these interven-
tions restrict interests that many view as important with sig-
nificant welfare implications. Again, restrictions on whether 
one can reproduce seem to impinge the most on what in other 
work I have referred to as a potential “right to be a genetic par-
ent,”111 and thus we should be particularly skeptical of using at-
tenuated and speculative externalities as the basis for justify-
ing such regulation. Even forced delays in the timing of 
reproduction or the denial of particular partner choices limit 
liberty in significant ways.  
On some philosophical frameworks, there is a further ques-
tion of whether one should aggregate small negative externali-
ties or whether there are instead “irrelevant utilities.”112 On 
 
other interests and values that give meaning to the claim that an identifiable 
harm matters.”). 
 110. See, e.g., JOHN ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE 16–18 (1994) 
(adopting a strong view along these lines). 
 111. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 1121–25. 
 112. Utilitarians typically aggregate small harms to many people and 
count the sum. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 23–24 (1971) 
(discussing the societal balance of present and future gains against present 
and future losses). The deontologist Frances Kamm has instead suggested that 
not all harms and benefits are equal, under what she calls the “Principle of 
Irrelevant Utility”: Suppose two almost identical individuals A and B are mor-
tally ill and we have only enough serum to save one, but because of tiny differ-
ences in how much serum they need if we save A there will be enough serum 
left over to also cure person C’s sore throat, but if we save B there will not be. 
Kamm argues that it would be unjust in this circumstance to allocate the se-
rum to A rather than B on this basis as opposed to holding a straight lottery 
between the two. If the sore throat is not enough to justify giving A preference 
over B when everything is equal, says Kamm, it is an “irrelevant utility” such 
that even if we could save not only C’s sore throat but a million such sore 
throats, for example, it would not matter; the utility bonus is irrelevant and 
therefore even aggregated in large quantities cannot count. Quite different, 
she claims, would be a case where in fact the serum enables us to save C’s leg, 
which would be a relevant utility. See F.M. KAMM, MORALITY, MORTALITY: 
DEATH AND WHOM TO SAVE FROM IT 144–63 (1993); Frances M. Kamm, To 
Whom?, 24 HASTING CTR. REP. 29, 31–32 (1994). On this view, one might also 
suggest there are irrelevant disutilities, and in our context even if the aggre-
gate of small attenuated cost externalities “add up” to more than the concen-
trated negative externalities on those whose liberty is restricted by the inter-
vention, those small cost externalities may be as irrelevant as sore throats. 
Kamm’s claim is controversial. For one critique see John Broome, All Goods 
are Relevant, in SUMMARY MEASURES OF POPULATION HEALTH: CONCEPTS, 
ETHICS, MEASUREMENT AND APPLICATIONS 727, 727–28 (Christopher J.L. 
Murray et al. eds., 2002) (suggesting the argument only proves that curing a 
sore throat does not matter more than fairness in this context, not that curing 
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views that adopt a model of irrelevant utilities, the Reproduc-
tive Externalities approach faces additional difficulties.  
All that said, it may be that the attenuation of harms prob-
lem is fatal to Reproductive Externalities justifications of only 
some means of intervention but not others. That is, we might 
demand that the threshold point at which cost-externalities can 
count varies with the means by which the State seeks to influ-
ence the target decision and the concomitant invasion of liber-
ty, if any. While cost-externalities may seem problematic to jus-
tify an intervention that invades bodily integrity or imposes 
criminal sanction, it seems unremarkable for the government 
to use informational interventions like public service cam-
paigns for abstinence as a tool for minimizing even small and 
uncertain cost-externalities, and the other means seem some-
where in between. Thus, of all the regulations of reproduction 
discussed in Part I, abstinence education seems the most justi-
fiable on this ground because it demands that the individual 
only delay coital intercourse until adulthood or marriage, and 
because (to return to the Taxonomy developed in Part I) the 
means of influencing the target reproductive decision is the 
least intrusive, the provision of information.113 
In sum, the Reproductive Externalities argument seems 
only persuasive in a much smaller subset of cases involving 
high-probability harms that are likely to seriously impinge on 
the public fisc and where the means of influencing the target 
decision are less intrusive, which rules out most of the repro-
ductive regulations discussed above. 
2. Underinclusivity 
Deploying the Reproductive Externalities argument to de-
fend the interventions of Part I shows them to be problemati-
cally underinclusive.114 There are many forms of reproduction 
producing comparable or worse Reproductive Externalities and 
nonreproductive externalities, where no such intervention has 
been imposed. If many of us would reject intervention in those 
cases, and those cases cannot meaningfully be distinguished, 
 
a sore throat is irrelevant or would never count for anything, and offering as 
counter example the U.K. Health Services’ decision to give out millions of an-
algesics for headaches that at some level, due to health care rationing and 
fixed budgets, means that someone’s life will not be saved). 
 113. See discussion supra Part I.A–B. 
 114. This is similar to a problem I have raised for the non-person-affecting 
principle approach as discussed in Cohen, supra note 5, at 481–512. 
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that casts doubt about how good this reformulation is as a 
BIRC substitute.  
To wit, the genetic abnormalities resulting from brother-
sister incest are less likely to result and also less serious in 
terms of their effects on the population of resulting children 
than those that result from the mating of carriers of Tay-Sachs 
or a number of other genetic disorders. And yet our government 
has not required mandatory screening for these disorders—an 
intervention which is less liberty-intrusive as to particular in-
dividuals than the criminalization of brother-sister incest since 
it would merely force individuals to have the information, not 
control their sexual relationships—and it certainly has not 
made it illegal for Tay-Sachs carriers to reproduce. If you think 
brother-sister incest may be unique on legal moralistic grounds, 
the same point could be made as to many of the other interven-
tions I have discussed. Another example comes from the alleged 
effects on child welfare of single parenthood: the harms it is 
claimed will occur from single parenthood will be the same 
whether it arises coitally or through reproductive technology, 
such that someone who defends a restriction on reproductive 
technology use by single individuals ought to also apply the 
same limit to coital reproduction intended to give rise to single 
parenthood. 
This underinclusivity might not be normatively problemat-
ic if there were meaningful distinctions between what is regu-
lated and left unregulated, perhaps drawing on the difficulty 
and intrusiveness of attempts to regulate natural reproductive 
(as opposed to assisted reproductive) behavior. That response, 
however, fails to perfectly capture the current line of regulation 
in that we have directly regulated adult sexual activity by crim-
inalizing brother-sister incest while leaving alone procreative 
activities that portend much more certain and significant Re-
productive Externalities, so we ought to be cautious before fully 
buying into this possible distinction.115  
One might try to more defensibly distinguish sub-
categories of assisted reproductive technology use, for example 
by hiving-off assisted reproduction involving the gametes of 
partners in an intimate relationship from that using the gam-
 
 115. That said, one might avoid this problem by decriminalizing brother-
sister adult incest but retaining the other interventions discussed or by argu-
ing that brother-sister incest is special and criminalization is justified by a 
quite different and independent reason, such as the Legal Moralism I sketch 
below. 
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etes of strangers to that relationship. Whether that move is 
persuasive depends on one’s valuation of different forms of pro-
creative and parental autonomy. This is a big question, and one 
that deserves its own article, so I will just confine myself to a 
couple of brief remarks. The philosopher Daniel Statman has 
described the interest in reproduction as 
the desire to achieve a kind of immortality by continuing to live 
through descendants, the desire to live vicariously through one’s chil-
dren, getting a second chance, as it were, the desire for the deep and 
enduring intimate relations that one hopes to achieve with one’s off-
spring, the longing for a home, a nest, a secure place with a close 
network of relationships in which one belongs, and, in addition, the 
interest of couples to found a family.116 
On one reading of that list, only reproduction by those 
without any genetic tie to the offspring (none of the cases in 
Part I) is distinguished. On a different reading, regulating re-
production that involves even one non-intimate partner (single, 
LGBT parents, commercialized surrogacy) is more justified be-
cause of the lower status of the interests represented by that 
kind of procreation. Would we be right in thinking that for the 
interest to be worth protecting, there must be a perfect overlap 
between the genetic partners, romantic partners, and rearing 
partners? Certainly some religious conceptions of procreation 
that condemn it outside of marriage view reproduction as wor-
thy because it unifies an already existing romantic relation-
ship, but that is a conception against which many of us would 
chaff. Even if this kind of move succeeds (and I am not at all 
sure it does) it still would not defend drawing the line between 
coital and assisted reproduction as such; instead it would coun-
sel making a division between reproduction by single parents, 
however it is achieved, and reproduction by intimate partners. 
Thus, the underinclusivity seems to persist and demands that 
we either reject some of the interventions in Part I or add pro-
hibitions on their coital equivalents. If we are unwilling to do 
so, that is some reason to doubt the Reproductive Externalities 
approach as a sufficient justification. 
The underinclusivity problem seems even more pronounced 
on the intrafamilial externalities variant. Consider the decision 
as to how many children to have, one that is currently left 
largely unregulated in the West. It seems likely to me that the 
externalized cost to one existing child of having five additional 
siblings added to the family through coital reproduction is far 
 
 116. Statman, supra note 15, at 226. 
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greater than the externalized cost to that child of having one 
additional child added if the additional child was conceived via 
an anonymous sperm donor; this seems true even if we used 
the social science data painting the most detrimental effects to 
children of being the product of anonymous donor conception. 
Thus, if we actually cared about preventing intrafamilial ex-
ternalities, we should favor regulating the number of children 
one can have as well as (or instead of) donor anonymity. Of 
course, the echoes of China’s one child policy are quite chilling 
in this regard. 
3. The Problem of Enhancement 
A third objection is that the Reproductive Externalities ap-
proach proves too much in that it ought to justify not only the 
moral wrongfulness of reproductive decisions to avoid what I 
have elsewhere called diminishment—producing a child who is 
on balance significantly worse-off as compared to the normal 
child, a child who will “experience serious suffering or limited 
opportunity or serious loss of happiness or good”117—but also a 
duty to engage in enhancement—to produce a child who is, on 
balance, significantly better-off as compared to the “normal” 
child (scare quotes used to emphasize the loaded nature of this 
term).118 
There is no reason why the amount of externalities im-
posed by the average child should be given moral significance 
as a baseline. If the argument justifies regulating reproduction 
to reduce externalities in excess of those imposed by the normal 
child, it is not clear why it ought also not justify using the same 
means to prompt enhancement to further reduce externalities 
below the level of those imposed by the normal child, assuming 
the externalities are of the same size, attenuation, etc.119 This is 
particularly troubling because, if the amount of externality-
reduction one gets from certain enhancements are far greater 
than those from merely preventing diminishment, it would 
 
 117. Cohen, supra note 52, at 363 n.46 (citation omitted).  
 118. Again, I have made similar points as to the non-person-affecting prin-
ciple approach in Cohen, supra note 5, at 481–512. 
 119. It may be that as to particular enhancements and diminishments that 
assumption is not warranted, that the negative externalities avoided by legal-
ly requiring enhancement are smaller or more attenuated than those by legal-
ly requiring diminishment, but the opposite could also be true. In a sense, the 
first objection I consider to the Reproductive Externalities approach has been 
sensitive to this possibility, and here I am holding that objection constant and 
imagining the same externalities either way. 
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seem as though the State was more justified in employing 
means designed to prompt enhancement than some of the 
means employed in the examples in Part I. This too can be 
thought of as an underinclusivity problem, with the State’s ac-
tions being problematic in taking steps to prevent parents di-
minishing their children but not pushing parents to enhance, 
when on the Reproductive Externalities approach the two are 
equivalent. Otherwise put, this is a baseline problem familiar 
to legal academics that asks why the level of externalities im-
posed by the normal child today is normatively significant. 
Notice, though, what adopting a duty to enhance would 
mean: It is not enough to avoid an incestuous reproductive 
partner; one would have failed in one’s duty if one did not 
choose as good a reproductive partner for one’s child as possi-
ble. Similarly, it is not enough to abstain from reproductive sex 
during one’s adolescent years. Instead a woman might fail in 
her duty to her child unless she waits until her career, wealth, 
etc., are in the ideal position for child-rearing. And, if genetic 
enhancements improving the lives of the children who result 
are possible, one who fails to use them would have failed in this 
duty. If endorsing the reproductive externalities approach re-
quired this conclusion, for many that would be a reason to not 
endorse it.  
Still more troubling is what this means for legal regulation 
of reproduction. If, in spite of my objections in this Part, one 
takes the Reproductive Externalities approach to justify legal 
regulation of reproduction for cases involving diminishment, 
and the Reproductive Externalities approach does not distin-
guish diminishment and enhancement, then legal regulation 
(including potential criminal sanction) of reproduction to force 
enhancement is equally justified. Can this approach avoid that 
implication? 
One response would be to try and distinguish reproductive 
activities that fail to enhance from those that diminish on an 
act-omission basis: failure to enhance is like failing to perform 
an easy rescue of a drowning person, which (in American law) 
is typically not made tortious or criminal. This approach will 
not work. Bracketing whether the act-omission distinction 
should have purchase even in the drowning person case, it 
seems particularly weak as to Reproductive Externalities. One 
can, for example, make the classic Legal Realist move of ques-
tioning the baseline: Why should the baseline level of accepta-
ble externalities be that of the average child such that the fail-
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ure to enhance beyond that is an omission, instead of treating a 
child that produced fewer externalities as the baseline and 
treat parents who fail to enhance as having acted? Indeed, it is 
not clear there are any true omissions here at all. In both the 
enhancement and diminishment context the individual has en-
gaged in a reproductive act that has brought someone into ex-
istence and produced externalities.  
A different response is that one need not be committed to a 
maximization thesis (or more accurately a minimization thesis 
as to net negative externalities); instead one could be more of a 
Sufficientarian about externalities. In normative ethics, 
Sufficientarians are a group of Welfarist theorists not commit-
ted to maximizing welfare but instead with ensuring that indi-
viduals do not fall below a critical threshold of whatever is the 
currency of distribution.120 My imagined externalities 
Sufficientarian (I am not sure anyone has actually taken this 
position) is similarly not concerned with minimizing net nega-
tive externalities but instead in ensuring that net negative ex-
ternalities do not go above a certain set threshold; the claim 
would be that while regulating reproduction to avoid dimin-
ishment is needed to prevent externalities above the threshold, 
requiring enhancement is unnecessary because without it the 
normal child is already at threshold. Even to construct the sen-
tence reveals that this would be a tremendous just-so story: in 
order to maintain such a claim, one would need a Goldilocks 
theory explaining why the externalities imposed by the average 
child are just right, and I am aware of no theory that adequate-
ly defends such a claim.  
A different response is that enhancements are distinguish-
able in practice because there are safety or theological concerns 
with genetic manipulation,121 because some enhancements are 
not good for the child (to the extent they allow parents to 
hegemonically foreclose certain avenues for the child instead of 
securing a “right to an open future”),122 because we lack suffi-
cient foresight to pick good traits,123 or because the availability 
of enhancements problematically exacerbates inequalities be-
 
 120. See Roger Crisp, Equality, Priority, and Compassion, 113 ETHICS 745, 
757–63 (2003); Harry Frankfurt, Equality as a Moral Ideal, 98 ETHICS 21, 21–
25 (1987).  
 121. See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, in THE ETHICS OF 
HUMAN CLONING 3, 18–24 (1998).  
 122. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 69, at 156–203. 
 123. Id. at 179–82. 
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tween those who have access to enhancing technologies and 
those who do not.124 Even assuming arguendo that these points 
were true as to all genetic enhancements, the arguments seem 
less apposite as to the duties towards non-genetic forms of en-
hancement that parallel our cases (delaying reproduction, 
choosing particular reproductive partners, etc.). 
However, the assumption that the enhance-
ment/diminishment line maps neatly on to the more-
burdensome/less-burdensome one is problematic. There are 
some forms of enhancement that would require a fairly small 
restriction on liberty (for example, taking a particular dietary 
supplement once a week while pregnant that is shown to im-
prove the intelligence of resulting children beyond the normal 
range) while there are some actions one would need to take to 
avoid diminishment that will involve significant limitations on 
one’s life choices (for example, being unable to reproduce as a 
single or LGBT individual, or being subject to criminal sanction 
unless one chooses a reproductive partner other than one’s ge-
netic sibling with whom one is in love).125 If what matters to us 
is the level of restriction in relation to the size of the externali-
ty, it would be better to draw the line on that criterion directly, 
rather than using the enhancement-distinction as a muddled 
heuristic—indeed I suggest doing so below. That would, howev-
er, still allow the State to legally require some enhancements. 
It is still open to us to take the other horn of the dilemma 
and accept a symmetrical duty to enhance such that the state 
can justifiably use the same legal interventions as in Part I not 
only to induce substitutions of “normal” for diminished children 
but also to induce the substitution of enhanced children for 
“normal” ones. For some, this implication of the Reproductive 
Externalities approach may be unsettling enough to justify re-
jecting it. For others (of which I would include myself), the in-
tuitive discomfort of supporting legally enforceable duties to 
enhance can be mitigated by introducing limiting principles 
such as requiring extremely large negative externalities and 
the least intrusive of the means of influencing the target repro-
ductive decision.126 However, (assuming we have rejected the 
externalities sufficientarian approach) whatever cabining we 
must do on the enhancement side to make the non-person-
 
 124. See id. at 187–91. 
 125. Cf. FEINBERG, supra note 14, at 163–65 (making a similar point for 
criminal law). 
 126. See supra Table 1. 
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affecting principle approach plausible ought to apply equally on 
the diminishment side. I believe many of the interventions jus-
tified by BIRC will not be supportable on the Reproductive Ex-
ternalities approach, when so cabined, as I discuss in more 
depth below. 
4. The Problem of Positive Externalities 
Suppose we are able to overcome the prior three problems 
and can restrict ourselves to preventing diminishment, in a 
way that avoids problematic underinclusivity or attenuation of 
externalities. Even if we accomplished all that, there is a fur-
ther problem with Reproductive Externalities as a justification 
for legal intervention.  
As against cost-externalities, which are negative, we have 
to also consider the positive externalities of the existence of 
these children. Just as courts in the wrongful life context are 
unwilling to conclude that from a child’s own perspective the 
impairments it faces outweigh the positive benefits of its exist-
ence,127 from a social welfare point of view we ought to be cau-
tious in concluding that our (third-party) lives would be better 
if these children did not come into existence than if they did. 
Even if we assume arguendo that children raised by single par-
ents, conceived through anonymous sperm donation, etc., im-
pose externalized costs sufficient to justify intervention based 
on a Millian Harm Principle,128 these children may also make 
significant social contributions to education, art, or wealth, be-
cause of these same conditions. Moreover, even if we became 
convinced (arguendo) that they made fewer contributions to so-
cial welfare than did the “better” children, that does not mean 
that their contribution is a net drain on the well-being of others.  
Here I am somewhat eliding a further complicated ques-
tion for the argument by mixing in what are strictly cost and 
noncost externalities. Suppose that the birth of these children 
produces a predictable increase in social spending on education 
programs and therefore increases tax burdens. On the positive 
externalities side, can that be outweighed by a very non-
monetary benefit, for example the creation of more music by 
artists like Alicia Keys, who was raised by a single mother?129 
 
 127. See supra text accompanying notes 87–92.  
 128. See JOHN STEWART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Albury Castell ed., F.S. Crofts 
& Co. 1947) (1859). 
 129. Alicia Keys Biography, BIOGRAPHY CHANNEL, http://www.thebiography 
channel.co.uk/biographies/alicia-keys.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2012).  
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Or are benefits from the existence of music and increased tax 
burdens the kinds of things that belong in separate spheres of 
valuation such that they cannot be traded off?130  
One possible response to all of these concerns would be to 
borrow from a suggestion Dan Brock and Derek Parfit have 
made in the non-person-affecting-principle approach that I 
have discussed elsewhere,131 and limit the scope of the argu-
ment to same-number substitutions: we can restrict the argu-
ment to the claim that interventions are justified where an in-
dividual whose reproductive decisions are targeted will 
substitute a child that imposes fewer cost externalities on oth-
ers than a child who would impose more—that is apply the ar-
gument only where the same number of children will exist and 
our regulation merely steers one into coming into existence in-
stead of the other.  
That solution comes at the cost of substantially narrowing 
the set of interventions for which externality-based arguments 
can be used. Interventions aimed at influencing whether indi-
viduals reproduce are completely untenable on this justification 
since the result is never a same-number substitution, and regu-
lation of when or with whom an individual reproduces may 
have de facto effects on the number of children born that will 
push them out of the same-number category. For example, as I 
have noted elsewhere, if we required that all sperm donors be 
non-anonymous we are likely to both reduce the supply of do-
nors and cause some parents to be unwilling to reproduce 
through sperm donation, thus changing the number of children 
who come into existence.132 
Even when limited to same-number cases, the Reproduc-
tive Externalities approach is still susceptible to a more subtle 
objection: even if most children born without the regulation 
would impose more net negative externalities than those we 
would substitute in their place, it is possible that allowing their 
 
 130. Cf. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF 
PLURALSIM AND EQUALITY 3–10 (1983); Dan W. Brock, Separate Spheres and 
Indirect Benefits, 1 COST EFFECTIVENESS & RESOURCE ALLOCATION 4 (2003), 
http://www.resource-allocation.com/content/1/1/4; Cohen, supra note 43, at 
696–703.  
 131. Cohen, supra note 8, at 481–512; I. Glenn Cohen, Response: Rethink-
ing Sperm-Donor Anonymity: Of Changed Selves, Nonidentity, and One-Night 
Stands, 100 GEO. L.J. 431, 441–42 (2012) [hereinafter Cohen, Rethinking 
Sperm-Donor Anonymity].  
 132. See Cohen, Rethinking Sperm-Donor Anonymity, supra note 131, at 
435–37.  
 1232 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:1187 
 
birth occasionally produces someone who creates such huge 
positive externalities to the world (a Mozart, a Van Gogh) that 
he outbalances the net negative externalities of the others. In a 
quite different context, Savulescu offers one response to this ob-
jection: even if you were worried that use of Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis to select embryos without a predisposition to 
asthma for implantation might result in eliminating a Mozart, 
not choosing such embryos might result in that as well.133 It is 
not clear the same point holds here in that one might think be-
ing a great artist is not independent to one’s health and condi-
tions of upbringing the way it appears to be independent of be-
ing an asthmatic. One might also make a hedge-your-bets-type 
argument that in the face of uncertainty it would be desirable 
that children of both types come into existence, or a synergy ar-
gument that great artists (to use my recurring example) 
emerge out of the interactions between children reared in dif-
ferent environments, although it is possible that the forms of 
reproduction we do not regulate create enough diversity in this 
regard. In any event, even if this objection is overcome, the lim-
itation to same-number cases is likely fatal to most of the regu-
lations of reproduction described above.  
5. Complications of Trading-Off Externalities Against the 
Value of Newly Created Children 
Between a claim that net externalities are negative in a 
given case and the desire to prevent these births, there lie two 
other intellectual complexities that also push towards limiting 
the Reproductive Externalities argument to same-number cases.  
Externalities-Only? The first complexity stems from dis-
tinguishing a position that truly cared only about externalities 
from these acts of reproduction versus a position that cared 
about externalities but also added to the calculus the value of 
these additional children’s lives should they come into exist-
ence. I will illustrate using a crude utilitarian framework and 
some fictional numbers, but I emphasize that a parallel point 
can be made on any other Welfarist frame, which is to say this 
complexity is inevitable for any theory that cares about the wel-
fare of individuals as a component of what makes the world 
good.134  
 
 133. Julian Savulescu, Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the 
Best Children, 15 BIOETHICS 413, 418 (2001). 
 134. Deontologists face a similar problem as well, since they often begin with 
a commitment to pursuing the Good, but merely add constraints and options.  
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Suppose a child born to a woman over age forty-five gener-
ates positive externalities for its genetic parents of 2, negative 
externalities for the world at large (other than the parents) of 
3, but the child’s existence and its own happiness adds to the 
world utility (or some other measure of welfare or well-being) of 
2.135 On a view that cared only about externalities the net ex-
ternalities are -1, in which case one can conclude that the re-
productive act poses net negative externalities and perhaps 
that action is justified. By contrast, on the view that the child’s 
existence counts positively in the calculus, the calculus favors 
the reproductive act (2 + 2 >-3). John Broome has described the 
externalities-only view as one that treats “the lifetime wellbe-
ing of a person who is added to the world [as] is in itself ethical-
ly neutral,” that is, “the goodness of the person’s own life does 
not count ethically.”136  
The externalities-only view is simpler because it does not 
require us to balance the value of the child’s coming into exist-
ence as against the negative externalities to others. However, it 
is probably wrong. Why would we ignore the value one’s life has 
to favor only looking at externalities? Imagine that every indi-
vidual in our population will have utility 4 and produce net 
negative externalities of -1. Imagine we have a choice of having 
3 individuals in our population or 10. On the view that we ig-
nored the utility of new individuals’ lives, we ought to favor the 
smaller population because there will be more net negative ex-
ternalities with the larger population, but it seems wrong to ig-
nore the fact that we now have 7 additional lives, lives so good 
that they more than compensate for the net negative externali-
ties in a global comparison. Indeed, in this hypothetical if we 
could add 5 billion people with utility 5000 (but each with net 
negative externalities -1), the externalities-only argument 
would say it would be wrong to do so, which seems perplexing. 
To be more tangible, it is possible we already live in a world 
where children produce net negative externalities—our planet 
 
 135. That this number is positive is significant because it means the child 
has a life worth living.  
 136. John Broome, Should We Value Population?, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 399, 400 
(2005). At this juncture it is worth reiterating that here (as throughout the 
project) I am not claiming that children are harmed if they are not brought 
into existence. Instead I share with others the view that “no one is harmed in 
not being created, because there is no one to be harmed if we do not create 
someone.” Kamm, supra note 75. However, there is a difference between say-
ing X is harmed by not being brought into existence, and that in evaluating 
whether a world where X is brought into existence is preferable we ought to 
consider (at least in part) the goodness of X’s life. 
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is already heavily populated. If all we cared about were net 
negative externalities, it may be that something like China’s 
one child policy should be favored, even if we knew every addi-
tional child produced would have a quite happy life and the 
sum of that happy life and its externalized benefits would far 
outweigh the net negative externalities. I have tried to make 
this argument here in a less formal and more intuitive way, but 
others have supplied more formal versions that are also quite 
persuasive.137 
Average or Total? Assume we reject the externalities-
only view and instead adopt a view that counted the child’s ex-
istence and the happiness it might bring into the global calcu-
lus. We now face the second complexity: do we treat the child’s 
welfare as counting in a total or an average way, akin to a 
problem I have discussed with non-person-affecting princi-
ples.138 As part of a consequentialist theory—I will again use 
utilitarianism instead of other variants of consequentialism for 
explanatory simplicity139—one could have two quite different 
views about how to aggregate utility between persons. Total 
utilitarians would sum up the utility of every individual in the 
set such that a population of 100,000 people with utility of (il-
lustratively) 5 each would be more desirable than (indeed twice 
as desirable as) a population of 50,000 people with utility 5 
each; by contrast, average utilitarians would divide all utility 
by the number of individuals in the population such that both 
of those hypothetical populations are equally desirable.140 On 
the total view, each new child’s welfare counts against the net 
negative externalities. By contrast, on the average view, it is 
the effect of the new child’s welfare on the average utility that 
is traded-off against its effect on negative externalities. 
Let us return for a moment to my earlier example—the 
choice between a population of three or ten, each with utility 
four and net negative externalities of negative one. On the total 
view, the addition of the seven other individuals would be fa-
vored since it adds four more per child, or twenty-one in total 
 
 137. E.g., LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOM-
ICS 387–90 (2008); Broome, supra note 136. Broome suggests that while the 
welfare of these not-yet-existing children should count in evaluating the good-
ness of a state of the world, it may not create a responsibility to produce these 
children, thus avoiding the problematic suggestion that there is a duty to repro-
duce in a way that maximizes total utility. Broome, supra note 136, at 412–13. 
 138. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 481–512. 
 139. Once again, the equivalent problem is faced by deontologists as well.  
 140. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 52, at 260–62.  
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(which, of course, ultimately have to be traded-off as against 
the net negative externalities of negative four). On the average 
view, we ought to be indifferent as to whether these seven peo-
ple are added to the population—the average utility of the chil-
dren born will be four either way. One could also construct cas-
es where the total utilitarian favored one population and the 
average affirmatively favored another.141 
Which view should we favor, total or average? Kaplow has 
offered two thought experiments to show why the total view 
seems superior.142 Imagine that we are choosing between popu-
lation A of 10 individuals with utility 100 or population B of 
nine individuals with utilities of 110 each. The total view pre-
fers A, the average view prefers B. Kaplow’s first argument asks 
us to imagine ourselves behind a veil of ignorance uncertain 
whether we are one of the individuals who exist in both A or B, 
or just in A. He then suggests that rational maximization would 
lead us to prefer being one of the 10 individuals who do certainly 
exist in population A versus having a 90% chance of being one of 
the actual individuals and a 10% chance of not existing.  
Perhaps motivated by uncertainties as to the value of veil 
of ignorance type arguments when nonexistence is involved, 
Kaplow also offers a second argument. Suppose we begin with 
population C of 10 individuals with utility 100 (such that total 
utility is 1000 and average utility is 100). Now suppose that we 
could implement a regime that would raise each existing indi-
vidual’s utility to 105 and add an additional individual with 
utility 28 that is above the threshold of a life worth living. Call 
this population D (total utility is 1078, average is 98). Under a 
variation of the Pareto principle, Kaplow suggests D is better 
than C, because all individuals who are alive under either re-
gime prefer D to C, even though C has lower average utility—
everyone is made better off, no one is made worse off. This 
alone suggests total is a better measure than average, because 
there are Pareto-superior distributions where average utility 
has decreased while total utility has increased. Finally, imag-
ine we can “implement a further reform that equalizes utility 
for all individuals at an average level that is one unit higher 
than that in [population D],” call this population E (total utility 
 
 141. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 12, at 521 n.141 (demonstrating the 
possibility of divergences between total and average utilitarianism with sever-
al examples). 
 142. The following description is drawn (with some slight simplifications 
and clarifications) from KAPLOW, supra note 137, at 387–89.  
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is 1089, average is 99), which “raises total utility and also dis-
tributes it more equally, which raises social welfare under any 
standard [social welfare function] (utilitarian or strictly con-
cave).”143 In moving through two steps from C to E “we have 
moved from a population of 10 with a utility of 100 each to a 
population of 11 with utility a 99 each,” and “[i]f each step in-
volves an increase in social welfare, then so must the  
combination.”144 
If the total view is adopted it will be harder for the Repro-
ductive Externalities argument to justify the reproductive regu-
lations discussed in Part I, because they have a tendency to re-
duce the number of children brought into existence, each of 
whom adds to welfare.  
What holds us back from adopting the total view whole-
sale? It threatens to lead to what Parfit has termed the Repug-
nant Conclusion—“[f]or any possible population of at least ten 
billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be 
some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if 
other things are equal, would be better, even though its mem-
bers have lives that are barely worth living.”145 It “would imply 
that we should increase total happiness slightly by vastly in-
creasing the population, even though we thereby make every 
existing person much worse off,” and it is “[o]nly person-
affecting principles [that] seem likely to avoid unacceptable 
implications like the Repugnant Conclusion, since only they re-
quire that a reduction in suffering or an increase in happiness 
be to a distinct individual.”146 This is illustrated in the top half 
of Diagram 1: we could vastly expand our population from the 
bar on the left (seven billion people with utility five each = thir-
ty-five billion total utility) to the bar on the right (eighty billion 
people with utility .5 each = forty billion total utility). This 
would result in a much larger number of people with lives just 
barely worth living, thus increasing total utility but producing 
people with much worse lives than we currently have. 
 
 
 
 
 
 143. Id. at 388. 
 144. Id. 
 145. PARFIT, supra note 69, at 388; see also KAPLOW, supra note 137. 
 146. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 69, at 254. 
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Diagram 1 
 
 
However, average utilitarianism also appears to lead us to 
a different kind of repugnant conclusion, which Parfit calls the 
“Mere Addition Paradox” (represented in the lower half of Dia-
gram 1), that the world would be better if Adam and Eve, both 
with very high utility existed alone rather than if in addition to 
Adam and Eve there also existed fifty billion other people with 
very good lives but utilities just below Adam and Eve (say 
9.99999 repeating). That is, the latter world is a worse one on 
the average view, since the addition of these people has dimin-
ished the average from what it was with just Adam and Eve ex-
isting. This conclusion seems wrong. Indeed, perhaps still more 
strangely, the average utilitarian should be indifferent as to 
Adam and Eve, each with utility ten, existing versus Adam and 
Eve plus fifty billion other people, all with utility ten, existing, 
for in each case the average utility is exactly the same. 
Both Brock and Parfit candidly admit that the only way to 
avoid both of these paradoxes is to provide a comprehensive 
theory that mixes person-affecting and non-person-affecting 
principles—they call it “Theory X”—but note that no such com-
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prehensive theory has yet been formulated.147 Therefore, as I 
have discussed elsewhere, Brock and his co-authors limit the 
scope of the application of non-person-affecting principles to 
same-number cases.148 Only in these cases—where the number 
of individuals brought into existence stays the same and we 
merely substitute higher for lower welfare children—can we be 
sure that the move is desirable. This same solution is available 
here. As discussed above, we could limit the Reproductive Ex-
ternalities approach to same-number substitution cases, but 
only at the cost of limiting the scope of cases to which the Re-
productive Externalities approach will justify regulating  
reproduction.149 
6. Internalizing the Externality 
In many instances, when legal arguments identify negative 
externalities as a problem the preferred solution is to redesign 
the system such that individuals internalize the externality. In 
principle, a form of that argument is available here. If the prob-
 
 147. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 69; PARFIT, supra note 69, at 390. 
 148. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 69. See also Cohen, supra note 8, at 489. 
 149. If forced to choose, there may be good reasons to favor the total view. 
See KAPLOW, supra note 137. See generally Tornbjörn Tännsjö, Why We Ought 
to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion, 14 UTILITAS 339 (2002) (arguing the total 
view and resulting repugnant conclusion is not actually repugnant). In regards 
to “hybrid” views that apply total utilitarianism when the population is small 
but average utilitarianism when the population approaches the size of ours, 
see Philip G. Peters, Implications of the Nonidentity Problem for State Regula-
tion of Reproductive Liberty, in HARMING FUTURE PERSONS 317, 326 (Melinda 
A. Roberts & David T. Wasserman eds., 2009) (citing Thomas Hurka, Value 
and Population Size, 93 ETHICS 496, 497 (1983)), I have argued that any view 
relying too heavily on average utilitarianism seems problematic in how it 
identifies what is wrong with reproduction when we believe it to be wrongful. 
See Cohen, supra note 8, at 489–93. Such views suggest that the wrongfulness 
of a reproductive act depends on whether the child created is above or below 
the average utility of all other existing individuals–but that seems deeply 
counterintuitive. Why should the wrongfulness of my reproductive activity be 
measured relative to that of other reproducers in my society? The average util-
ity of the world is quite different today than in 1850, which means that pro-
ducing the same child could be morally permissible in 1850 but morally im-
permissible today. Consider your own life. Most of us think that our parents 
did not act wrongly by producing us. And yet this approach would suggest that 
to know if that is right we would have to compare our utility with that of all 
other persons in society at the moment of our birth, and if we fall below the 
mean our existence could validly (indeed should) have been prohibited. Indeed, 
if tomorrow, other parents begin having children with much higher utility 
than our own utility, then our reproduction which was permissible today 
would suddenly become wrongful tomorrow, notwithstanding that no fact 
about our own lives have changed. This is deeply counterintuitive. 
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lem with the kinds of reproduction we are discussing is that it 
imposes costs on third parties in the form of governmental 
spending, we could in theory allow individuals to buy their way 
out of the problem by putting up a bond in advance for expens-
es.150 Of course, estimating in advance the cost of the externali-
ties would be difficult but we could set it conservatively at five 
times our best guess of the cost in order to be safe.  
While this may seem fanciful, in some instances it would 
actually not be very hard to implement: we could, for instance, 
impose a surtax on IVF for single parents or on a commercial-
ized sperm, egg, or surrogacy provision. The State could then 
(theoretically) use that extra revenue to offset the externalities 
caused by these children through things like grants to schools, 
the juvenile justice system, etc. Doing so would not only substi-
tute a less intrusive means of influencing the reproductive de-
cision (taxation as opposed to criminal sanction) but also a tai-
lored one that sought to target the precise harm that justifies 
intervention. 
Such a move would, of course, pose inequality concerns 
since some individuals would not be able to pay the surtax to 
access reproductive technologies. Such inequalities do not 
strike me as particularly worrisome for at least three reasons. 
First, these costs are not an arbitrary tax but one that is aimed 
to make whole those harmed by the reproductive activity, thus 
one analogy is to tort damages. The fact that some tortfeasors 
are wealthier and better able to pay for their compensatory tort 
damages (and thus less deterred from committing the tort in 
the first place) does not make us think tort law is inappropri-
ately inequitable, and it is not clear it should in this situation 
either. Second, this would arguably be consistent with our cur-
rent tendency in the United States to ration access to many 
health care goods by ability to pay. Although many find that 
tendency unjust, against this background, taxing some forms of 
reproductive-technology use looks unexceptional. The solutions 
to the larger problem—redistribution at a high level—might 
take care of this problem too. Third, we could always subsidize 
the poor as we do elsewhere in the health care system. 
To be sure, there are practical issues here, but the more 
important theoretical pay-off is that in principle the State has 
 
 150. Cf. Robertson, supra note 69, at 18 (noting offhand in the case of ge-
netic abnormalities that “even if the conditions are more serious, if the parents 
have knowingly accepted the risk and have the resources to rear their child, no 
harm to others will occur”).  
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no good reason to intervene in the ways discussed in Part I as 
to those parties willing to pay for the externalities caused by 
their reproduction. 
7. The Specter of the New Eugenics 
Like the Non-Person-Affecting Principle approach, the Re-
productive Externalities approach threatens to rely on objec-
tionable eugenic premises.151 Expressively, it threatens to sug-
gest to a member of the set of individuals it targets (or at least 
to the children who sneak past its gates and come into exist-
ence): “we are expending state resources to prevent people like 
you from coming into existence because we think the world is 
better off if people like you (physically disabled, mentally re-
tarded, raised by LGBT or single parents, etc.) were replaced 
by other people.” This is a far cry from the goal of preventing 
harm to vulnerable populations that underlies much of the ap-
peal of BIRC reasoning. This is not to say that such reasoning 
is necessarily invalid, but it does require a direct confrontation 
with the eugenics movements of old and the question of what 
made the old eugenics wrong. 
In United States law, eugenics is most famously associated 
with Justice Holmes’ claim in Buck v. Bell that “[t]hree genera-
tions of imbeciles are enough” as a reason to uphold a Virginia 
policy of involuntarily sterilizing an allegedly “feeble-minded” 
person who had already produced one “feeble-minded” child.152 
Eugenics was notorious as a central part of the Nazi movement 
that seized on the notion of blood, called for the purification of 
their nation’s gene pool in order to “regain the nobility and 
greatness of their genetically pure forebears,” and gave rise to 
prohibitions on sexual relations between Jews and Aryans, 
“Genetic Courts passing judgment on [] genetic fitness,” mar-
riage advice clinics, and ultimately mass sterilization and eu-
thanasia programs targeting Jews and other minorities.153  
It may seem fatal that the Reproductive Externalities justi-
fication, with its focus on how the birth of certain kinds of chil-
dren harms the rest of us, echoes the rhetoric of this movement. 
As Buchanan and his co-authors caution, “the central theses of 
a social movement, including its moral premises, ought not to 
be dismissed because of the intellectual and ethical failings of 
its adherents.” Yes, “[e]ugenics is recalled as the Nazis’ racial 
 
 151. Cohen, supra note 5, at 500. 
 152. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205, 207 (1927). 
 153. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 69, at 38–40. 
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doctrine, which it was, but to be a eugenicist, then or now, is 
not tantamount to being a Nazi,” or at least not necessarily.154 
In more colloquial terms, we ought to be wary of trying to score 
points by comparing our opponents to Nazis.  
Elsewhere I have discussed two arguments distinguishing 
the “new” eugenics represented by the reproductive regulations 
discussed above and the old eugenics movements.155  
The first argument seeks to draw distinctions between the 
means of regulating reproduction used. To summarize my con-
clusion in the companion piece, I think this distinction cannot 
save reproductive regulations that use criminal law means, but 
that things are less clear as to some of the other less intrusive 
means.156 Imagine the State decided not to enforce surrogacy 
contracts only as to a category of parents who were likely to 
produce significant negative Reproductive Externalities—some 
states already refuse judicial preclearance (and thus enforce-
ment) of surrogacy agreements when the intending parents are 
not married heterosexuals.157 Or suppose that instead the State 
sought to fund abstinence education programs that target only 
particular subgroups likely to produce these negative Repro-
ductive Externalities, for example those with heritable disabili-
ties such as deafness. This would certainly be less bad than in-
voluntarily sterilization, but even the funding of informational 
interventions to dissuade reproduction carries with it a worri-
some message. And while one might distinguish the message, 
“your existence is so unworthy that it should be prevented” 
from “your existence produces negative externalities that socie-
ty should not be forced to bear,” that distinction is one that is 
likely to be lost on most listeners. Still at least for the less in-
trusive means, this may offer some room between the new and 
old eugenics.158 
A second argument would seek to distinguish the old eu-
genics movement’s targeting of genetic unfitness and the 
transmission of genes as the source of harm from the new eu-
genic movement, which in some cases is focused on preventing 
children from coming into being whose rearing conditions (sin-
gle parent, unaware of parent’s identity, etc.) produce negative 
 
 154. Id.  
 155. Cohen, supra note 5, at 502–03. 
 156. Id.  
 157. See Daar, supra note 25, at 43. 
 158. Cohen, supra note 5, at 503. 
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externalities.159 Although tempting, I have explained in the 
companion article why I do not find that distinction satisfying: 
while these examples may not require condemning a person as 
a repository of genes, in some instances they do nonetheless 
condemn the person, the approach requires a very strong con-
ception of genetic essentialism or luck egalitarianism that I 
think may be problematic; to the extent we are restricting indi-
viduals from reproducing due to criteria that are not their fault, 
the gap between the new and the old eugenics thus narrows.160  
For all these reasons, I find the difficulty in distinguishing 
the practices discussed in Part I from the old eugenics to con-
stitute an additional problem faced by the Reproductive Exter-
nalities, but perhaps not as serious a problem as the others I 
have outlined above.161 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id., at 503–04. 
 161. To be clear, finding any of these approaches unconvincing from a nor-
mative/political theory perspective does not necessarily mean that they cannot 
serve as a constitutionally permissible justification for regulation under exist-
ing U.S. federal constitutional law doctrine. As I have discussed elsewhere, 
what constitutional standard applies to regulations of reproduction, especially 
those relating to reproductive technology, is underdetermined by existing doc-
trine and very unclear. See id. at 513–17. If strict scrutiny applied there would 
be clear problems of underinclusivity hinted at above, cf. Skinner v. Oklaho-
ma, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942) (stating that Oklahoma’s distinction between 
sterilization of “those who [had] thrice committed grand larceny” and those 
who had thrice embezzled was constitutionally problematic), as well as 
overinclusivity problems to the extent there are blanket policies for single and 
LGBT users rather than individualized parental fitness testing. See Rao, su-
pra note 28, at 1479–88 (discussing equal protection challenges for denials of 
access to reproductive technology). Further, it is not completely clear that pre-
venting Reproductive Externalities qualifies as a “compelling state interest” 
under strict scrutiny. On the one hand, Holmes’ justification in Buck v. Bell 
that “[it] is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate 
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can pre-
vent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind,” 274 U.S. 200, 
207 (1927), while never overruled, is so reviled it might be an antiprecedent, 
rendering problematic the Reproductive Externalities approach by association. 
On the other hand, perhaps the family privacy cases discussed in Part I might 
serve as guidepost: only very large externalities or externalized costs relating 
to the ability of resulting children to don the mantle of citizenship would be 
compelling, but the State is not free to interfere in order to realize some Pla-
tonic or Spartan ideal society.  
On rational basis review, by contrast, preventing even small, attenuated, 
or not clearly net negative externalities can count as “legitimate” state inter-
ests justifying regulation. Motorcycle helmet laws are a good analogy and have 
been upheld based on the disability costs born by society of drivers who are 
injured without helmets. E.g., Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 1519, 1522 (11th Cir. 
1989); see also Melissa Neiman, Motorcycle Helmet Laws: The Facts, What Can 
Be Done to Jump-Start Helmet Use, and Ways to Cap Damages, 11 J. HEALTH 
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  * * *   
The foregoing discussion suggests that the use of Repro-
ductive Externalities as a justification for regulating reproduc-
tion is much more fraught and less convincing than it might 
have initially appeared. Nonetheless, for reasons that will be-
come more clear after I discuss the other possibilities in the 
remainder of this Article, the externalities approach is likely 
the best of a bad lot. What the limitations and concerns I have 
raised here suggest, though, is that if we were to go beyond 
best interests and be honest about Reproductive Externalities 
as the reason for regulating reproduction, we would settle on a 
much smaller swath of such regulation. In particular, we would 
be justified in regulating only cases where (1) same-number 
substitutions were likely, (2) externalities are net negative, 
large, and not attenuated, and (3) we could not plausibly derive 
a scheme by which individuals internalize their externalities, 
especially given the implications for enhancement and the ex-
pressive closeness to the eugenics movement.162 Moreover, re-
turning to the framework introduced in Part I.B.2, the showing 
we should demand on these three factors should be greater 
when the means of influencing the target decision is more, ra-
ther than less, (negative) liberty-limiting; thus, a more persua-
sive showing on these factors should be required when the 
State seeks to prohibit certain reproductive activities altogeth-
er through its criminal law than when it uses informational  
interventions.163  
 
CARE L. & POL’Y 215, 236–37 (2008) ( listing cases that analogize the “right to 
choose to wear a helmet to reproductive decisions”). Under- and 
overinclusivity are not problems on rational basis review. Williamson v. Lee 
Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (noting that courts will defer to legislative 
judgments that “[e]vils in the same field may be of different dimensions and 
proportions, requiring different remedies. . . . [o]r the reform may take one 
step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most 
acute to the legislative mind. . . . [or t]he legislature may select one phase of 
one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others”). 
 162. See discussion supra Part II.A.5–II.A.7. 
 163. Most forms of regulating reproduction that satisfy these limitations on 
the Reproductive Externalities approach (especially as to same-number cases, 
and less intrusive means of regulating reproduction) can also be endorsed on 
the non-person-affecting principle approach discussed in Regulating Reproduc-
tion. Cohen, supra note 5, at 481–513. While I have some doubts about that 
approach and find Reproductive Externalities somewhat preferable, the fact 
that there is an overlapping consensus between these two approaches as to 
some cases is further reason to think that such regulation is most justified in 
those cases. 
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Applying this analysis to the existing regulations of repro-
duction discussed in Part I suggests few if any will be justified 
on this account. The two best candidates seem to be abstinence 
education and the prohibition on incest between adult brothers 
and sisters, but neither is assured. Abstinence education seems 
more likely to be a same numbers case, and the means of influ-
encing the target decision is informational, but the externalized 
harms are uncertain, small, and attenuated. The genetic ab-
normalities from adult brother-sister incest are likely a same 
number case and to portend larger and less attenuated exter-
nalized costs than the other examples from Part I.B.1, but giv-
en that they use criminal prohibition as the means of influenc-
ing the target decision we ought to demand a very persuasive 
showing in order for this approach to be justified. I think one’s 
ultimate verdict may depend on a separate normative judgment 
about how much of an imposition it is to have a possible roman-
tic partner declared verboten. The yuck factor here may tempt 
us to dismiss the interest of the individuals in this case as 
weak, but perhaps a broader reflection on the importance of 
partner choice—both in rising social movements regarding gay 
rights, and in the literary tradition of forbidden love epitomized 
by Romeo and Juliet164—might cause us to reconsider. In any 
event, what this analysis suggests is that on the Reproductive 
Externalities approach the State would be far more justified in 
discouraging adult brother-sister incest if it used a less liberty-
limiting means of influencing the target reproductive decision.  
As I have foreshadowed before, in the end I think the Re-
productive Externalities approach, even with all its problems, 
will end up being the best alternative to the now-dismissed 
BIRC framework. In order to substantiate that claim, though, 
the next two Parts consider the remaining alternatives. 
III.  WRONGING WHILE OVERALL BENEFITING   
The Non-Identity Problem renders problematic the idea 
that children are harmed if brought into existence with lives 
worth living. The Reproductive Externalities approach shifts 
the emphasis from harm to resulting child to harm to third par-
ties. The approach I develop in this Part can be understood as 
shifting the criteria for moral wrongfulness from harm to a con-
ception of wrong absent harm, or as offering a conception of 
harm where the fact that an individual is overall benefited is 
 
 164. See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET. 
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insufficient to save the act from being wrongful.165 I focus on 
adapting one version of this approach suggested by Seana 
Shiffrin in the wrongful life context, which I think is the most 
fully fleshed out version developed with an eye to legal applica-
tion, but other versions of this approach also exist.166 Shiffrin’s 
focus is on tort liability for wrongful life liability, but as I dis-
cuss below it is possible one might extend her views as support 
for criminalizing conduct or some of the other means of regulat-
ing reproduction discussed above.  
Shiffrin rejects what she calls the “comparative model” of 
harm that treats harm and benefit as representing two sides of 
the same scale and its “principle that one may inflict a lesser 
harm on someone simply to benefit him overall, when he is un-
available to give or deny consent.”167 She instead endorses an 
asymmetrical noncomparative approach on which “harm,” as 
defined by Shiffrin, is associated with “absolute, 
noncomparative conditions (e.g., a list of evils like broken 
limbs, disabilities, episodes of pain, significant losses, death, 
etc.)” and “benefit” is associated with “goods (e.g., material en-
 
 165. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 518. It would be nice to call this “harmless 
wrongdoing,” but because Feinberg has used this moniker to cover Legal Mor-
alism as discussed below, see generally JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1984) (discussing morally 
wrong conduct that causes no harm or violates no rights), I use this somewhat 
clunkier term to avoid confusion. 
 166. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 119–20; see, e.g., Davis, supra note 7, at 12 
(arguing that “disabled persons wishing to reproduce themselves in the form of 
a disabled child. . . . violate the Kantian principle of treating each person as an 
end in herself and never as a means only” because “they define the child as an 
entity who exists to fulfill parental hopes and dreams, not her own”); Harman, 
supra note 7 (arguing that “[a]n action harms a person if the action causes 
pain, early death, bodily damage, or deformity to her, even if she would not 
have existed if the action had not been performed” and “reasons against harm 
are so morally serious that the mere presence of greater benefits to those 
harmed is not in itself sufficient to render the harms permissible: when there 
is an alternative in which parallel benefits can be provided without parallel 
harms, the harming action is wrong”); Kamm, supra note 7 (“[C]reators owe 
their creations, at reasonable cost, certain things that I call the ‘mini-
ma . . . .’[which] involve more than just things that make lives barely worth 
living . . . . [such that] I do not think that giving half a loaf, as distinct from 
giving a whole loaf and then taking half away, is permissible if the half a loaf 
falls below the minima.”); Woodward, supra note 7, at 813 (arguing from a 
principle that “it can be wrong to adopt a course of action which will both 
bring certain obligations into existence and make failure to meet them una-
voidable, even though this course of action affects another’s overall interests 
as favorably as any other course of action would”). 
 167. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 119–22, 127. 
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hancement, sensual pleasure, goal-fulfillment . . . ) . . . .”168 
Shiffrin then distinguishes between two types of benefits, those 
that represent the “removal[] from or prevention[] of harm” 
and a residual category she terms “pure benefits.”169 She argues 
for a principle that it is permissible to inflict a lesser harm to 
remove or prevent a greater harm, but wrong to do so in order 
to confer a pure benefit.170 
For some cases both her view and the comparative view 
produce the same result. To use Feinberg’s example, when a 
rescuer must break the arm of an unconscious person (who 
therefore cannot consent) in order to save him, the comparative 
view suggests the action is right because the individual has 
been overall benefited, the harm of the broken arm is out-
weighed by the benefit of being saved.171 On Shiffrin’s view the 
action is also permissible, but for a quite different reason, be-
cause the harm of the broken arm is permissible because it is 
done to avoid a greater harm.172 
In other cases, though, the two views diverge. Shiffrin il-
lustrates using the fanciful hypothetical (hereinafter I will re-
fer to it as Wealthy/Unlucky, and I mention precisely the facts 
she does)173 of a wealthy inhabitant of an island (Wealthy) who 
cannot set foot on another island nor communicate with its in-
habitants. The other island’s inhabitants are comfortably well-
off, but Wealthy desires to make them richer. The only way for 
Wealthy to do this is to drop gold bullion cubes each worth five 
million dollars from his airplane while passing over the island 
knowing there is some risk he may hurt someone. Most people 
are delighted by the gold drop, but one person (Unlucky) is hit 
by a falling cube and his arm is broken. If Unlucky thinks that 
all things considered he has benefited since the cost of repair-
ing his arm is less than five million dollars (though he is un-
sure whether he would have consented ex ante to the risk) 
then, on the comparative view the action is not wrongful—a 
harm has been inflicted to produce an overall benefit.174 On 
Shiffrin’s view, however, the action was wrong, because harm 
 
 168. Id. at 123. 
 169. Id. at 124. 
 170. Id. at 124–27. 
 171. JOEL FEINBERG, FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 
27 (1992). 
 172. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 125.  
 173. Id. at 127–28 (setting out the full hypothetical). 
 174. Id. at 128. 
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was inflicted without prior consent to bestow only a “pure bene-
fit” not the avoidance of greater harm, and therefore Wealthy 
owes compensation to Unlucky for that harm.175 Shiffrin thinks 
most of us would conclude that Wealthy acted wrongfully,176 
suggesting her noncomparative view is the correct one. 
Shiffrin then extends the idea to wrongful life cases, sug-
gesting that no one is harmed by not being created, such that 
being born confers on the child only a pure benefit but not the 
avoidance of harm.177 We can apply her analysis to the kinds of 
cases discussed in Part I: for example, in brother-sister 
incestual sex one can argue that the parents have without prior 
consent (which would be impossible in all our cases) imposed a 
harm on the child not to avoid a greater harm, but to bestow a 
pure benefit (existence). Therefore, they have acted wrongfully 
even though they have benefited the child overall.178 While 
Shiffrin ultimately marshals this analysis to justify tort com-
pensation, at first glance one could also adapt the same argu-
ment to justify any of the means of influencing the target re-
productive decision. Still to be fair, going forward I will ask the 
reader to imagine these arguments as Shiffrin-esque rather 
than Shiffrin’s own argument. 
In the remainder of this Part, I consider several problems 
with applying Shiffrin’s framework to justify regulating repro-
duction in our cases, which I order from more general to more 
specific, namely: (1) in general the noncomparative approach to 
harm is implausible; (2) as applied to reproduction, the argu-
 
 175. Id. at 128–29. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 119–20. 
 178. At one point Shiffrin suggests that even if in a case like 
Wealthy/Unlucky one is skeptical about the noncomparative view of harm and 
thinks that the pure benefit (if great enough in amount) can morally justify 
the imposition of harm, there are two other features of the procreative case 
that makes her argument even stronger there: “[i]n most cases, the absence of 
a pure benefit is experienced by a person or, otherwise makes a difference in 
the content of his life” leading to the “strength of the moral impetus to bestow 
pure benefits,” in that we can say Unlucky’s life is better with the benefit and 
we think making his life better is good. Id. at 134. But “[i]n the case of procre-
ation, though, this sort of moral reason for beneficence is not generated, be-
cause the potential beneficiary does not exist” such that “[e]ven if the failure to 
bestow a benefit were on a par with harm [as the view Shiffrin rejects con-
tends], the failure to be created is a ‘harm’ that would never, even indirectly or 
as an opportunity cost, affect an ongoing person’s life”; that is, “[t]he fact that 
the ‘harm’ or absence of benefit represented by not procreating will not affect 
an existent person or her life in progress renders the benefit bestowed by crea-
tion far less morally significant.” Id. at 135. 
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ment either proves too much (in suggesting that all procreation 
is prima facie wrongful) or too little (in that many parents al-
ready share in the burdens of their children produced through 
delinquent forms of reproduction); (3) Shiffrin’s 
Wealthy/Unlucky intuition pump contains several problematic 
elements, does not map properly on to procreation, and is too 
quick in dismissing the possibility of hypothetical consent; (4) 
the approach faces particular problems in justifying means of 
influencing the target reproductive decision that involve crimi-
nalization of behavior or impinging on bodily integrity. While I 
ultimately consider her approach unpersuasive, I should make 
clear at the outset just how brilliant I find Shiffrin’s argument. 
A. THE PLAUSIBILITY OF THE NONCOMPARATIVE APPROACH TO 
HARM 
Shiffrin’s key insight is to examine how wrongful life cases 
look different when harm and benefit are disaggregated 
through a noncomparative model that distinguishes harm done 
to avoid/prevent greater harm and harm done to confer a pure 
benefit. Thus, her approach is only as plausible as that 
noncomparative approach. How plausible is the 
noncomparative approach?  
To begin with, it requires a rejection of most (if not all) 
forms of consequentialist reasoning. Consequentialist theories 
aggregate harm and benefit both within and across individuals 
as opposite inputs into an individual’s welfare, such that some 
amount of any harm (short of death perhaps) can be out-
weighed by some amount of benefit. Shiffrin’s view instead 
suggests that pure benefits cannot cancel out unconsented to 
harms such that there is a side-constraint against maximizing 
what consequentialists might otherwise regard as the Good. Of 
course this is not fatal to her view: among philosophers, deonto-
logical theories that constrain consequentialist reasoning are 
highly favored, although even those theories usually conceive of 
deontological side constraints being applied to baseline conse-
quentialist theories. In any event, all I mean to emphasize is 
that her noncomparative view of harm requires much more of a 
break with consequentialism than do other solutions to the 
Non-Identity Problem we have so far canvassed, and that alone 
may make it implausible for those with contrary fixed moral 
theory commitments.  
Second, outside of reproduction, in areas such as tort and 
criminal law theory more generally, several authors have at-
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tacked the noncomparative theory of harm espoused by 
Shiffrin. In work on the comparative nature of punishment, 
Adam Kolber offers this kind of example: Stuart viciously beats 
a homeless man, after which Tommy, unaware of Stuart’s ac-
tion, subsequently plucks three hairs from the homeless man’s 
head.179 Because, according to Shiffrin’s noncomparative model 
of harm, the homeless man is actually worse off after Tommy’s 
actions than after Stuart’s, Kolber suggests that Shiffrin’s view 
would say that Tommy harmed the homeless man more than 
Stuart did, that this conclusion is absurd and only avoidable by 
importing comparative notions, and that thus Shiffrin’s view 
“cannot properly measure harm severity.”180 In his work on tort 
theory, Scott Hershovitz has suggested that the paradoxes 
Shiffrin identifies with the comparative theory of harm can be 
resolved by being more precise and suggesting that harm is not 
just any setback of interest, but a setback of someone’s interest 
that violates a right they have.181 Others have also critiqued the 
noncomparative approach.182 
For those persuaded by these critiques, the 
noncomparative approach is flawed to begin with and therefore 
Wronging While Overall Benefitting will not work as a justifi-
cation for regulating reproduction. For those not persuaded by 
these critiques, though, in the remainder of this Part, I show 
why this approach still will fail. 
B. PROVING TOO MUCH AND PROVING TOO LITTLE 
Unlike the other BIRC-substitutes canvassed in this Arti-
cle, Shiffrin’s framework might justify all (rather than only a 
subset) of the regulations of reproduction discussed in Part I. 
However, this capaciousness is also worrisome in that it 
threatens to prove too much and condemn all procreation: as 
Shiffrin recognizes, her argument suggests that wrong has 
been done not only in the exceptional case of wrongful life but 
also in all normal, healthy procreation, because even in the 
normal case the child “must endure the fairly substantial 
 
 179. Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. 
REV. 1565, 1579–81 (2009). 
 180. Id. Perhaps a proponent of Shiffrin’s view might refine the theory to 
be comparative as between harms, but not as between harms and pure benefit, 
to avoid this critique. 
 181. Scott Hershovitz, Two Models of Tort (and Takings), 92 VA. L. REV. 
1147, 1164–66 (2006). 
 182. E.g., Stephen Perry, Harm, History, and Counterfactuals, 40 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 1283, 1301–03 (2003). 
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amount of pain, suffering, difficulty, significant disappoint-
ment, distress, and significant loss that occur within the typical 
life,” harms that are imposed without consent only to bestow a 
pure benefit (existence).183 If the argument requires us to accept 
this conclusion—that all procreation is actually wrongful—for 
most that will be a good reason to reject the argument. 
Sensing the risk of a reductio ad absurdum here, Shiffrin 
considers (although she actually does not commit herself to) a 
weaker version of her claim that procreation wrongs another 
without being all-things-considered wrong, in that “[o]ne might 
believe that imposing overall beneficial conditions that none-
theless involve significant burdens is permissible, when the 
beneficiary is unable to consent, if one attempts to alleviate or 
partially shoulder the burdens one imposes”; that is, procrea-
tion standing alone is not wrong, instead what is wrong is “to 
procreate without undertaking a commitment to share or alle-
viate any burdens the future child endures.”184 Shiffrin is not 
very explicit about what she has in mind in terms of an obliga-
tion to share or alleviate burdens: most of her discussion cen-
ters on legal support (in particular financial support), though 
some of her language suggests it goes further.185  
With this move, though, Shiffrin’s approach threatens to 
prove too little to adequately justify the regulations of repro-
duction discussed in Part I. To the extent we assume arguendo 
that there are extra deficits that children experience in being 
born to and reared by LGBT parents or teenage parents, for ex-
ample, it would seem as though those deficits are already being 
shared by those parents in rearing the child, such that we 
might say that these parents are already “paying for it.”186 This 
 
 183. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 137–39. On Shiffrin’s view, the wrongfulness 
of the action is not defeated because the lack of prior consent was due to the 
fact that no one existed who could give consent—this is in part what leads her 
to discuss implied consent, which I analyze below. If one thought the non-
existence of someone able to give consent was itself enough to create a wedge 
between the procreative case and Shiffrin’s Wealthy/Unlucky hypotheticals, 
then the case against her approach would be stronger still. In what follows, 
though, I put this problem to the side and show other problems with her  
argument.  
 184. Id. at 139. 
 185. Id. at 142–48. 
 186. Shiffrin herself seems to acknowledge something similar in suggesting 
that “[f ]or those with relatively minor burdens (in contrast to those born in 
difficult circumstances or with significant disabilities), parental support and 
acknowledgement of responsibility may be all that is appropriate to expect,” 
and suggests as a prudential matter that she might limit tort liability only to 
cases where “people are hampered by extra burdens—for example, ever-
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is particularly true as to the case of increased risks of genetic 
abnormalities resulting from incest, where the fact of a child’s 
disability imposes many hardships on the lives of parents.  
Shiffrin’s argument might do better in condemning as 
wrongful the use of reproductive technologies by those over age 
fifty if the prospective parent is so old that we think she is like-
ly to die before the age of majority of the child, thus failing to 
share in some of the burdens of the child. This objection to the 
aged prospective parent’s behavior, however, might be over-
come by the same means discussed for the externalities argu-
ment—by placing a bond to cover any support obligations up-
front if she is unlikely to live long enough to give the child 
support to the age of maturity; something similar could be re-
quired for single parents. Indeed, in the case of the aged parent 
we might think trusts and estate provisions for the child al-
ready satisfy whatever bond requirement exists—although in-
terestingly as a doctrinal matter in the United States, except in 
Louisiana, there is no requirement that an individual leave 
enough money to support their child through to maturity even 
in the run-of-the-mill case.187  
A related concern with Shiffrin’s approach is it not clear 
why it has to be the progenitor who him or herself bears the ob-
ligation of directly sharing the burden of the child rather than 
ensuring that someone else can do so. For example, assuming 
an older woman’s spouse is younger and willing and able to 
take on support obligations should his wife predecease him, has 
the couple acted wrongfully in bringing the child into existence? 
Similarly, as to surrogacy or anonymous sperm donation, if the 
intending couple who will ultimately bear and rear the child 
can adequately provide for the child, why has the gestational or 
genetic parent not adequately negated the wrongfulness of her 
procreative act? 
Shiffrin’s position on this matter is not entirely clear but 
seems to augur against this form of substituted support. At one 
point she suggests that an anonymous sperm donor as “an inte-
gral, voluntary, participant in the creation process [should not] 
be able to avoid responsibility for the life he has created,” and 
 
present significant pain, hindering disabilities, or life-threatening or shorten-
ing diseases.” Id. at 141–42. However, as I noted, when she discusses anony-
mous sperm donation there are hints she may actually countenance a more 
expansive category. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 187. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 519–21 
(8th ed. 2009). Even the Louisiana statute allows disinheriting children for 
just cause. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1621(A) (2008). 
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thus “should not be able to waive the rights of the child to sup-
port or damages should that child be in need.”188 The last words 
suggest that in fact the duty of support only kicks in given the 
absence of another source of support, such that one might act 
wrongfully only if one brings the child into existence without 
someone else to support it. Later on, however, in discussing 
anonymous sperm donation and adoption more generally, 
Shiffrin suggests that to avoid wrongful actions parents must 
not only bear financial liability but also “moral accountability 
for the lives they create,” by which she means that “legal struc-
tures that permit biological parents, genetic donors, and gesta-
tional carriers to remain anonymous interfere with the child’s 
opportunity to consult one’s biological parents in adulthood,” 
and that those 
who participated in the initiation of a life should . . . at the least, be 
accessible to the child, at some point, to participate in a justificatory 
dialogue about the child’s origins—that is, to discuss why the life was 
created, to relay familial history, and to listen to the child’s account of 
his difficulties and burdens.189  
Once again, though, it is not clear why on Shiffrin’s view 
one could not negate the moral wrongfulness of procreation by 
finding a substitute to provide these things. For example, why 
would it not satisfy this duty if the parents of a donor-conceived 
child told the child that, “We, your rearing father and your ge-
netic mother sought a sperm donor in order to bring you into 
the existence because we wanted a child to love who was genet-
ically related to us and Daddy was infertile”? Why should 
knowledge about one’s family history be connected to obliga-
tions to support a child financially or emotionally, and why 
should either of those obligations be saddled exclusively on ge-
netic parents when many others can be participants in bringing 
a child into existence?  
There is a divergence between a version of the argument 
that is more relational—X harmed Y by creating her, therefore 
X (and not Z and not society as a whole) must be the one to 
make Y whole—versus one premised on the notion that it is 
wrong for X to create Y without making sure that Y will receive 
adequate support going forward. What is the wrongful act? 
Producing a child who is not provided for, or producing a child 
one ensures is provided for, where the parents who provide for 
it are not its genetic parents?  
 
 188. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 144–45 (emphasis added). 
 189. Id. at 145. 
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The former seems a much more defensible form of con-
straint than the latter to me, but what is important is that they 
would justify finding wrongful quite different kinds of repro-
ductive activities. On the stronger relational type of argument, 
all forms of third-party assisted reproduction are all-things-
considered wrong because one parent involved in creating the 
child does not provide support for the resulting child, whether 
or not the child is adequately supported. Indeed, as applied to 
gestational surrogacy this view might imply that the child is 
wronged even if both of its genetic parents provide support, be-
cause the gestational mother who participated in its creation 
did not provide any support—thus, the child is wronged for 
failure of all three parents creating it to support it, even though 
a child produced coitally would not be wronged if two of its cre-
ating parents supported it. This seems to undermine the plau-
sibility of Shiffrin’s claim. Perhaps more pointedly, Shiffrin’s 
argument would lead us to conclude that all single parent re-
production (assisted or coital) is all-things-considered wrong 
and ought to give rise to a kind of tort liability in analogy to 
wrongful life. On the weaker thesis, by contrast, only forms of 
single parent and anonymous sperm donation (and possibly re-
production by older parents) might be wrongful, and then only 
if they fail to ensure adequate support for the resulting child. In 
any event, even on the stronger version of the thesis it is unclear 
why finding a substitute is not an adequate form of corrective. 
One could push this idea much further: what counts as 
“adequate” support? If an over 50-year-old woman will be 
around until the child turns eighteen, but not longer, has she 
satisfied her duty of support, or does the support duty extend 
beyond its legal limits to the age of majority? Is the duty to 
support envisioned by Shiffrin one that depends on empirical 
findings on what kind of environments children flourish in—for 
example, suppose one accepted the (contested) literature on 
single parent reproduction showing children doing as well as 
those reared in two family households—or is it instead a hard-
and-fast rule irrespective of such empirical findings? If the lat-
ter, is it problematically hetero-normative and traditionalist in 
that it requires two parents absent any showing of deficit? 
Shiffrin’s discussions of these matters are fairly short, so it is 
unwise to expect determinate answers to these questions in her 
work. Just on its own terms, however, her approach cannot sus-
tain most of the regulations of reproduction discussed in Part I 
because it seems either overinclusive (in condemning all pro-
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creation), or underinclusive (in condemning only cases where 
children are truly without adequate support, which will be a 
minority of the cases, if any). 
A separate more internal question for Shiffrin’s argument 
is why parental support (financial and otherwise) has this 
wrong-mitigating effect? There is a way in which we can think 
of this kind of support as additional pure benefits added to the 
child to make the tally of harm to benefit more favorable, a 
kind of “boot” added to make up the weight of the harm, to bor-
row from income tax language.190 But if that is so, it seems we 
have moved away from a strict constraint of “avoid doing harm 
to confer a pure benefit” to a rule that pushes for something 
like a more reasonable harm to benefit ratio. If the ratio of 
harm to pure benefit is what matters, though, then we would 
be forced to do a balancing of the harms of these kinds of lives 
as against an assessment of the benefits of existing—the exact 
thing the courts in the wrongful life context are loathe to do, 
and Shiffrin’s approach seemed poised to avoid.  
C. THE INTUITION PUMP, THE ANALOGY TO PROCREATION, AND 
THE REJECTION OF HYPOTHETICAL CONSENT 
The Wealthy/Unlucky case is Shiffrin’s main intuition 
pump for her conclusion regarding the permissibility of doing 
unconsented to harm to confer a pure benefit, so it deserves 
close scrutiny.  
As a threshold matter, I have to confess that I am quite 
unsure as to whether I think Wealthy has done something 
wrong to Unlucky on the hypothetical facts provided by 
Shiffrin, especially if (as Shiffrin is willing to concede in a foot-
note) I imagine that Wealthy acted with the best of beneficent 
intentions.191 Perhaps my intuitive reaction to the case is aber-
rant, but if more widely shared it is an interesting contrary da-
 
 190. See I.R.C. § 1031 (2006). One response Shiffrin might offer is that at 
least some forms of support actually allow the avoidance/prevention of harm, 
not the conferral of pure benefit. That response seems inadequate, though, for 
it only mitigates a harm that was created by the act of procreation, and while 
one who mitigates some of the harm one has created does better than one who 
fails to do so, it is hard to see how this completely erases the wrongfulness of 
doing harm in the first place on Shiffrin’s view. This may be why Shiffrin re-
sists committing to the thesis that support can adequately negate the wrong-
fulness of procreation and the view that procreation is all-things-considered 
wrong holds some appeal to her. 
 191. See Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 128 n.28 (claiming Wealthy’s intentions 
are irrelevant for her argument). 
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ta point. Indeed, if we take the courts’ rejection of wrongful life 
liability as a reflection of intuitions counter to that assumed by 
Shiffrin, one might ask why it is the wrongful life intuition that 
ought be reformed and not Shiffrin’s own intuition on 
Wealthy/Unlucky? 
Putting that issue to one side, let us zone in on 
Wealthy/Unlucky. It is important for Shiffrin to find a hypo-
thetical case that has four facts analogous to procreation192: (1) 
the act done only confers a pure benefit (rather than avoidance 
or prevention of harm), (2) the action was necessary (indeed the 
only way) to confer the benefit, (3) consent was impossible to 
get ahead of time, (4) and the individual is by her own conces-
sion better off for the act being done.193  
Because of the artificial nature of the hypothetical, I worry 
that on at least two of these facts, notwithstanding Shiffrin’s 
instruction to this effect, we are actually assuming the facts are 
exactly the opposite, and this may be what is triggering the in-
tuition in the direction Shiffrin reports. We are told that 
Wealthy’s method is the only way to confer the benefit and that 
consent was impossible to secure ahead of time, but everything 
we know about real life suggests the opposite: bullion could be 
dropped while individuals were asleep or shipped by boat, the 
island’s news media could have been alerted to the drop.  
Lest I be accused of committing the law student sin of 
fighting the hypothetical, let me clarify: I worry that the hypo-
thetical is so artificially constructed that the intuitions it is 
generating among readers are actually a spillover from intui-
tions about the real world version of this fact pattern where 
getting prior consent and conferring benefit ahead of time are 
not impossible. This is not a criticism of Shiffrin per se, but of 
recourse to the intuition pump method in general (a method 
that I, like many philosophically inclined scholars, am fond of), 
and a reason to be cautious about how probative are the data it 
can provide. Our moral intuitions develop from real world 
 
 192. At one point Shiffrin tells us the island’s inhabitants are comfortably 
well-off but Wealthy just wants to make them richer, id. at 127–28, presuma-
bly to make it clear that this is conferral of a pure benefit not harm avoidance. 
It is not clear that this can map onto the procreation case, though. The chil-
dren who are not yet born are not “comfortably well-off ”; in fact, they are not 
anything, they just do not exist. It is possible that this distinction might also 
spoil the analogy and complicate it as an intuition pump for the procreative 
case. 
 193. Id. 
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events, and the more we are required to imagine facts that are 
in direct opposition to the real world, the greater my concern. 
More substantially, I worry that Shiffrin’s hypothetical has 
given us two pieces of information in tension with one another 
(if not in flat-out contradiction) that may further jumble our in-
tuitions. The first is that Unlucky, whose arm is broken, “ad-
mits that all-things-considered, he is better off for receiving the 
$5 million, despite the injury,” but then in the next sentence 
notes that “[i]n some way he is glad that this happened to him, 
although he is unsure whether he would have consented to be-
ing subjected to the risk of a broken arm (and worse fates) if he 
had been asked in advance; he regards his conjectured ex-ante 
hesitation as reasonable.”194 In a footnote Shiffrin instructs us 
that some readers may “think it clear, even rationally mandat-
ed, that they would agree to a high risk or even the certainty of 
a broken arm for this payoff” but then instructs such readers to 
modify the hypothetical to one for which they would be uncer-
tain about their prior consent such as a year-long coma or a 
gouged-out eye.195 I find this puzzling. What would it mean to 
find a situation where I would admit I am all-things-considered 
better off but have doubts as to whether I would consent? 
Would not the refusal to consent in that action in such a situa-
tion actually be irrational? I worry that Shiffrin’s discussion of 
doubts about consent is subtly undermining the premise that 
the individual is (including by her own self-assessment) all-
things-considered better-off. 
This tension is a real problem for two reasons. First, the 
requirement that the individual believes that he is all-things-
considered better off is crucial to Shiffrin’s argument in the re-
production case (though she is not explicit on this point) be-
cause without this stipulation we might worry that an individ-
ual has a life not worth living, an approach discussed above. If, 
in their individual assessment they are better off, they neces-
sarily have lives that they believe are worth living. If so, her 
argument would merely demonstrate the already uncontrover-
sial claim that it is wrong to bring people into being whose lives 
are not worth living—a view the Non-Identity Problem does not 
deny, and I have shown is unable to save much of the reproduc-
tive regulation of Part I.196  
 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. at 128 n.25. 
 196. Cohen, supra note 5, at 472–74. 
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Second, in the reproductive case and beyond, the consent 
stipulation Shiffrin gives is important because she goes to great 
length to refute an objection to her view based on hypothetical 
consent—that the divergence between intuitions on the rescuer 
case and Wealthy/Unlucky is that while we assume that every-
one would consent in the rescuer case, we assume that is not 
true in the Wealthy/Unlucky case and (implicitly) that procrea-
tion looks more like the Wealthy/Unlucky hypothetical in this 
regard.197 Shiffrin argues instead that generic hypothetical con-
sent (not based on specific facts known about the victim and his 
preferences) is insufficient when harm is done to confer a pure 
benefit, especially when: “(1) if action is taken, the harms suf-
fered may be very severe; (2) the imposed condition cannot be 
escaped without high costs; (3) the hypothetical consent proce-
dure is not based on features of the individual who will bear the 
imposed condition.”198 The problem is that many of her readers 
will think it very likely that they would consent to procreation 
of their parents notwithstanding the potential that life will con-
tain the usual amount of miseries, set-backs, and the like.  
Shiffrin has a response to this concern that “a very high 
percentage of people claim to be glad to have been born,” name-
ly that “there are people who do regret being born and find the 
burdens of their lives too great” while “[o]thers are strongly 
ambivalent: [t]hey find their burdens are not entirely canceled 
out by the goodness of their lives and regard these burdens as 
ineliminable serious problems and intrusions” and “[a]lthough 
sometimes these reactions are unreasonable, it is hard to dismiss 
all these familiar, if unusual, reactions as wholly irrational.”199  
The problem with this response is that Shiffrin is now cre-
ating an asymmetry between Wealthy/Unlucky and the procre-
ation case. In the hypothetical she stipulated that Unlucky ad-
mits he was all-things-considered better-off for having the gold 
bullion dropped on his arm,200 but now, in explaining why we 
ought not to be so sure of hypothetical consent in the reproduc-
tive context, she supports that claim by arguing that some in-
dividuals are not (by their self-assessments) better-off.201 More 
formally, individuals are either (by their self-assessments) bet-
ter off or they are not for the action having occurred. If individ-
 
 197. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 131–33. 
 198. Id. at 133. 
 199. Id. at 133. 
 200. Id. at 128. 
 201. Id. at 133. 
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uals are better off if the action is taken and admit as much, 
then it appears they would in fact have consented, such that in-
ferring hypothetical consent is not a problem and Shiffrin’s ar-
gument has not overcome this objection and faces a problem; if 
instead they are truly not better-off for the action being taken 
and believe as much, then Shiffrin has only proven her point as 
to lives not worth living where we think individuals are really 
worse off for not having been brought into existence, and as I 
have discussed, none of the regulations of reproduction dis-
cussed above can plausibly fit in that category. 
It is possible Shiffrin means for us to distinguish between 
whether an individual is actually made better-off (i.e., objec-
tively) versus whether they assess themselves as having been 
made better-off (i.e., subjectively) before the event versus after; 
that is, that although Unlucky is both objectively and subjec-
tively better off ex post he might have been subjectively unsure 
ex ante, a sort of bounded rationality or affective forecasting 
problem. However, if he is both subjectively and objectively bet-
ter off for the act having been done, it is unclear why we ought 
to give dispositive weight to his ex ante hesitation in a situa-
tion where it is both impossible to ask for his consent and we 
cannot confer the benefit without acting. Moreover, when ap-
plied in the reproductive context, it is not clear what being sub-
jectively unsure ex ante would mean. These children are not 
subjectively unsure ex ante, because they are not anything ex 
ante, they do not yet exist. 
Harm and Benefit: A separate problem has to do with the 
nature of the harm in the hypothetical. By making the harm to 
Unlucky one of bodily integrity, it is possible that Shiffrin has 
tapped into a separate intuition about inviolability of the body, 
rather than a more general proposition of the wrongfulness of 
harming while overall benefiting. This would track doctrinal 
structures in tort treating bodily integrity violations as more 
serious than emotional distress ones.202 Suppose instead of a 
broken arm Unlucky suffered great embarrassment or sadness 
but was overall benefited by five million dollars. Does the intui-
tion remain that Wealthy acted wrongfully? If not, and we 
think the kinds of harms that result from procreation are more 
of the emotional distress type, the analogy between 
Wealthy/Unlucky and procreation may break down.  
 
 202. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures 
in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 489–510 (1998) (cataloguing and critiqu-
ing this tendency). 
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Shiffrin’s conception of what constitutes “harm” in the pro-
creation case might also be critiqued in a different way. 
Frances Kamm, for example, has rejected the idea that the 
things that give value to human life but which also cause pain, 
such as moral consciousness, could constitute being in a 
harmed state such that the normal acts of procreation could 
cause harm.203 She worries “Shiffrin’s argument would lead one 
to conclude that creating creatures incapable of moral choice, 
never in pain, and unaware of truths such as the prospect of 
death, like extremely happy, long-lived rabbits who have no 
other problems, would be preferable to creating human persons 
as they are now.”204  
Finally, on the benefit side, Shiffrin seems committed to 
the view that her Wealthy/Unlucky hypothetical should gener-
ate the same intuition no matter the amount of pure benefit in-
volved.205 But it may be that the hypothetical works (again, to 
the extent it actually pumps the intuition she claims it does) 
because of her choice of the kind and amount of benefit con-
ferred. The benefit—monetary—seems to come from a sphere 
distinctly separate from the harm—bodily integrity—and thus 
trades on a separate-spheres argument.206 If we altered that 
fact and altered the kind and amount of benefit, we may get a 
quite different intuition. To see this, keep the harm posed in 
Wealthy/Unlucky as the broken arm and transpose it into the 
procreative example: imagine that a parent reproduces know-
ing that their choice as to whether, when, or with whom to re-
produce will result in a child with a broken arm at birth that 
can be fixed the same way it can in Wealthy/Unlucky. Even af-
ter reading Shiffrin’s article, I think many would not have an 
intuitive reaction that this parent did something wrong. If so, 
that may stem from the fact that the benefit is at least partially 
in the same sphere as the harm (bodily life and health vs. a 
broken arm) and/or that the benefit is so much greater than the 
harm (life is a much greater benefit than five million dollars). 
If that is right, then Wealthy/Unlucky merely stands for a 
 
 203. Kamm, supra note 7, at 1382–84. 
 204. Id. at 1384. 
 205. I say “seems” because early on in the paper Shiffrin briefly imagines a 
variant of the rescuer case where the arm is broken instead to provide benefits 
like “twenty IQ points worth of extra intellectual ability;” however, she argues 
for the act’s wrongfulness not because it is a benefit from a separate sphere of 
the (physical) harm, but because it is a pure benefit. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 
127. 
 206. See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 130; Brock, supra note 130.  
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much more limited proposition and is not analogous to the pro-
creative case. 
D. CAN THIS VIEW SUPPORT CRIMINALIZATION OR BODILY 
INTEGRITY INTERVENTIONS?  
Even if Shiffrin’s theory can clear the hurdles discussed 
above, we face a separate question of whether it can ground 
criminalization or interventions that seek to invade bodily in-
tegrity such as sterilization (but from this point on I will just 
discuss criminalization). 
It bears emphasizing again that Shiffrin herself does not 
argue that her approach can justify liberty-limiting restrictions 
like criminalizing reproductive conduct; she instead suggests 
that “one may agree that procreation is morally problematic 
without entertaining any notion of directly regulating it” point-
ing to “[f]amiliar arguments against state interference with 
rights of bodily autonomy and concerns about the terrific poten-
tial for state abuse” as “prevent[ing] consideration of such dras-
tic measures.”207 Shiffrin instead endorses a weaker regulatory 
approach wherein those who engage in procreation “could rea-
sonably bear some legal duties to compensate [the resulting 
child] or otherwise help to shoulder the costs of this imposi-
tion,” which leads her to endorse a tort remedy similar to 
wrongful life suits although limited for prudential reasons only 
to the exceptional cases of “those born in difficult circumstances 
or with significant disabilities.”208 Thus, on Shiffrin’s own view, 
the framework she proposes will not substitute for the BIRC 
justification because it does not support criminalization as a 
means of targeting reproductive decisions. 
Of course, it may be that Shiffrin’s framework but not her 
own writing could actually support criminalization as a means 
of influencing the target reproductive decision-making. To put 
the problem more generally, is it morally justified to criminalize 
activities that cause harm to but overall benefit an individual?  
The substantive criminal law justification of choice of evils, 
which in the words of the Model Penal Code provides that the 
  [c]onduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm 
or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that: (a) the 
harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that 
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged, . . .209 
 
 207. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 139. 
 208. Id. at 139–42. 
 209. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(a) (1962). 
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represents a tempting analogy. That analogy would suggest 
that criminalization is inappropriate. Shiffrin’s noncomparative 
approach to harm, however, suggests that this analogy would be 
precisely mistaken in that the justification targets doing harm to 
avoid a greater harm not doing harm to confer a pure benefit 
that makes the individual all-things-considered better off.  
Again, it is very hard to find a real world case (apart from 
the procreative ones that are the subject of our inquiry) that 
could be used to test intuitions about criminalization. Recall 
that we need a case where (1) the act done only confers a pure 
benefit (rather than avoidance or prevention of harm), (2) the 
action was necessary (indeed the only way) to confer the bene-
fit, (3) consent was impossible to get ahead of time, and (4) the 
individual is (including by her own subjective ex post self-
assessment) better off. Therefore, perhaps returning to 
Shiffrin’s Wealthy/Unlucky hypothetical—despite some of my 
misgivings about it above—will be more useful. 
The question thus becomes, would it be desirable to crimi-
nalize the actions taken by Wealthy in Shiffrin’s hypothetical?  
Imagine for the moment that we are residents of the island 
on which Unlucky lives and where Wealthy has decided to drop 
gold bullion cubes. Ours is a small island with a legislature in 
which every citizen can vote, and a spy provides us with infor-
mation on Wealthy’s plans including his poor targeting and the 
risk that one of us may be Unlucky—although none of us knows 
who that might be and we are all at equal risk and we are 
without protective measures. One of our members then sug-
gests that we pass a law criminalizing exactly Wealthy’s behav-
ior, which we will publicize to him via a sign on a hot air bal-
loon announcing that if he attempts the action we will bring 
down his plane and imprison him. Behind a kind of veil of igno-
rance—not knowing who if anyone will have their arm broken 
and whether that (admittedly better-off ex post) person would if 
asked ex post also be unsure as to whether they would have 
consented ex ante—would you support passing such a law, as-
suming it will certainly have the desired effect of deterring 
Wealthy from acting?  
Imagine that one member of the legislature instead argues:  
  Everyone agrees that even if one is Unlucky, the gold bullion cube 
clearly makes the one hit better off, and even if there are a very small 
number amongst us who are not sure ex post whether they would 
consent to have their arm broken for five million, the vast majority of 
us are sure we would consent. We can only prevent the harm (which in 
fact does not make that person worse off though he might not consent 
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to it) to this small minority by foregoing the pure benefit. I am not sure 
if I will be in the double minority of people whose arm is broken AND 
are ex post unsure whether I would have consented, but am willing to 
take that risk! Who is with me in opposing the criminalization? 
Is it not likely that a majority of us would cast our vote 
against criminalization when presented with this argument? 
Again, one should be cautious about intuition pumps, but one 
thing I think my variation on Wealthy/Unlucky unpacks is a 
key difference between criminalization and tort recovery that is 
akin to Calabresi and Melamed’s distinction between liability 
rules, property rules, and inalienability rules.210 Inalienability 
rules provide entitlements an individual cannot voluntarily 
part with, while both property rules and liability rules confer 
on individuals an entitlement that they can consensually part 
with; property rules protect that entitlement by enabling courts 
to enjoin (or in the criminal context deter by sanction), while 
liability rules allow the violator to violate the entitlement but 
with the court setting a price after the fact for damages the vio-
lator must pay.211 Shiffrin’s approach is akin to a liability rule 
in that her approach to the wrongful life problem involves ex 
post compensation for the aggrieved Unlucky—if he asks for it, 
that individual is owed compensation for harm done to him 
that conferred on him (and others) a pure benefit. Thus, it may 
be possible to compensate him for the harm done (i.e., the bro-
ken arm) he did not and would not have consented to without 
adversely affecting the welfare of all others—the others being 
those who were benefited without being harmed (the many 
Luckys who receive gold bullion without injury) and those who 
are harmed but would have consented to it ahead of time if 
asked because of the overwhelming benefit. Indeed, if Wealthy 
would not drop gold bullion cubes (or would drop fewer cubes) 
knowing he will have to pay tort damages, it is likely that all 
these others in a Coaseian fashion would try to bribe Unlucky 
into taking the risk by parting with some of their gold bullion 
to allow the matter to go forward—and if Unlucky would accept 
the bribe, this again might suggest the problem is the amount 
of benefit.212  
 
 210. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 
1092 (1972). 
 211. See id. 
 212. This has interesting implications for Shiffrin’s claim, in the procrea-
tion case, that her theory best explains why parents, not society at large, owe 
duties of support to children. See Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 140 & n.42. In fact, 
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By contrast, if the hypothetical legislature were to block 
Wealthy’s activities outright through criminalization, Unlucky 
is protected, but at the expense of all of the other people who 
would rather the gold had been dropped. Thus, with criminali-
zation individuals are forced to forego a pure benefit without 
harm (or a pure benefit for harm they would gladly consent to if 
asked ex ante) because there exists some minority who are 
harmed (but overall benefited) and are unsure if they would 
have consented ex ante even though they concede they are bet-
ter off ex post. If this minority was a large enough share of the 
population, or if the pure benefit was small enough, we might 
vote for criminalization behind the veil after all. However, as to 
the procreation case Shiffrin is prepared to concede that “a very 
high percentage of people claim to be glad to have been born,” 
with only a minority regretting their birth or being ambivalent 
about it.213  
To be sure, it is a very strange exercise (if even possible) to 
imagine what a hypothetical legislature of not-yet-existing per-
sons would vote as to the criminalization of reproduction. But 
if, as Shiffrin maintains, the Wealthy/Unlucky hypothetical is a 
good analogy to procreation and we can reason about this issue 
through that (somewhat more tangible) example, then it seems 
the same point should hold: even if harming while overall bene-
fiting can justify a tort liability rule regime, it has a much 
harder time justifying outright criminalization of reproduction.  
Therefore, I find that even putting aside other concerns 
with the Shiffrin-esque approach, it also runs into serious trou-
ble justifying criminalizing reproductive conduct as the means 
of regulation.  
What about non-criminal means of regulation? While I 
have suggested that for the Reproductive Externalities ap-
proach (among others) less liberty-limiting means of influenc-
ing the target reproductive decision—through the information-
al interventions of funding abstinence education, for example—
are easier to justify, it is not clear that this is true on the 
Shiffrin-esque approach. If only a minority of individuals would 
not consent to the life they were given from being born to a 
teenage mother, while most treat the conferral of life onto them 
as a form of pure benefit akin to gold bullion for which they 
 
if we thought most individuals are both benefited by procreation and would 
have ex ante consented, perhaps they should be the ones who have an obliga-
tion to support the Unluckys of the world as a form of Coaseian bribery. 
 213. Id. at 133. 
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would gladly suffer broken arms in order to get, then discourag-
ing early motherhood through abstinence education may be in-
appropriate for the same reason as criminalization. Indeed, any 
means of intervention that would have the effect of reducing 
the likelihood that an individual will procreate would have this 
effect; in other words, any effective means of influence will pre-
sent this problem.214  
Although inventive and brilliant, for these reasons I find 
Shiffrin’s framework inadequate to do the work of BIRC and 
justify the regulations of reproduction discussed above. 
IV.  LEGAL MORALISM AND VIRTUE ETHICS   
The Reproductive Externalities approach sidesteps the dif-
ficulties faced by BIRC by focusing on harm to already-existing 
individuals. The two approaches more briefly canvassed in this 
Part also focus on negative effects on others, but effects outside 
of the narrow confines of harm, at least as understood in Mill’s 
Harm Principle.  
The first approach openly embraces the preservation of 
traditional mores as a reason to limit reproduction, and Joel 
Feinberg has called this approach Legal Moralism in the nar-
row sense—the use of criminal law or other regulatory tools to 
deter acts which neither harm nor offend but undermine public 
morality, in order to preserve traditional mores.215 The Legal 
Moralist approach remains a possible avenue for justification, 
but faces a few hurdles I discuss. I do not spend too much time 
on this approach, because this is a well-enough tread ground—
most famously in the Hart-Devlin debates, and I have less to 
add.216  
The second group of views can loosely be described as an 
application of Virtue Ethics—the view that concern with the 
virtue of the parents making these decisions justifies interven-
tion. I concentrate on recent work by Michael Sandel and 
Rosalind McDougall in this tradition on enhancement and sex 
selection respectively. I show that many of the parental deci-
sions at issue in the cases I have discussed are in fact conso-
 
 214. By contrast, Shiffrin’s own preferred approach—tort compensation—
seems potentially easier to justify, although for the reasons discussed in prior 
sub-sections, I am not sure why one should not conclude that the children in 
these cases are already adequately compensated, and even requiring tort com-
pensation has the potential to deter procreative activities ab initio. 
 215. See FEINBERG, supra note 14, at 27; FEINBERG, supra note 165, at 3–4. 
 216. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 165, at 15. 
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nant with their descriptions of parental virtue, and also show 
that a parental Virtue Ethics approach may not escape the 
Non-Identity Problem after all.  
A. LEGAL MORALISM 
BIRC-type reasoning may mask a quite different kind of 
reasoning motivating the interventions set out above: Legal 
Moralism, broadly defined as the use of criminal law (or other 
means of influence) to deter acts that neither harm nor offend 
but undermine public morality. One excellent example of an at-
tempt to uphold a law on Legal Moralist grounds is offered by 
Justice Scalia in his dissent in Romer v. Evans, the case that 
invalidated a Colorado constitutional amendment prohibiting 
all legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect 
homosexual persons from discrimination.217 Justice Scalia chas-
tises the majority for having “mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit 
of spite,” and argues that “[t]he constitutional amendment be-
fore us here is not the manifestation of a ‘bare . . . desire to 
harm’ homosexuals . . . but is rather a modest attempt by seem-
ingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores 
against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise 
those mores through use of the laws.”218 
A similar version is offered by Leon Kass in his essay on 
cloning (and reproductive technologies generally) in praise of 
“the wisdom of repugnance.”219 “Repugnance,” he argues: 
[R]evolts against the excesses of human willfulness, warning us not to 
transgress what is unspeakably profound. Indeed, in this age in 
which . . . our given human nature no longer commands respect, in 
which our bodies are regarded as mere instruments of our autono-
mous rational wills, repugnance may be the only voice left that 
speaks up to defend the central core of our humanity. Shallow are the 
souls that have forgotten how to shudder.220 
Among other things, Kass laments how reproductive tech-
nologies such as cloning (but we might add other reproductive 
technologies) turn “procreation into manufacture,” and that 
such technologies where the manufacturer “stands above [the 
creation] . . . not as an equal but as a superior, transcending it 
by his will and creative prowess” are “profoundly dehumaniz-
ing, no matter how good the product.”221 There are also ana-
 
 217. 517 U.S. 620, 636–53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 218. Id. at 636. 
 219. See Kass, supra note 121, at 19. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 38–39. 
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logues in other authors’ discussions of the sale of sperm, egg, 
and surrogacy services.222 
A parallel justification here suggests that these regulations 
of reproduction are justified not to prevent harm to the result-
ing child or third parties as such, but instead to prevent socie-
ty’s slipping into moral degradation. Because the argument 
does not rely on harm to resulting children, it effectively side-
steps the Non-Identity Problem. For the same reason, however, 
unlike any of the other BIRC alternatives or reformulations, 
the approach is quite unconcerned with the question of the wel-
fare of these resulting children—Legal Moralism can condemn 
acts of reproduction that produce very high welfare children, and 
champion those that produce children with very low welfare. 
In a few of the examples discussed in Part I—the criminal-
ization of brother-sister incest, prohibiting LGBT (and perhaps 
single individuals) from accessing reproductive technology—it 
seems quite plausible to me that Legal Moralism of this kind 
actually lies behind much of the legislative and scholarly sup-
port for these measures; that brother-sister incest is criminal-
ized for the purpose of maintaining taboos that support the ex-
isting family structure, that denials of reproductive technology 
to LGBT individuals have as their real goal the penalization of 
or the expression of social opprobrium for what some might call 
a deviant lifestyle rather than the prevention of harm to chil-
dren, etc. For other regulations of reproduction, the application 
of Legal Moralism may be less plausible as a motivation. 
Legal Moralist justifications are avowedly illiberal in that 
they require subscription to particular comprehensive moral 
theories and thus take sides on what constitutes the good life. 
To say that a particular argument pretends to offer a liberal 
Millian Harm Principle justification when in fact it relies on an 
illiberal kind of Legal Moralism is not to say that the latter jus-
tification is necessarily insufficient as a basis for government 
regulation. That said, others (in much more complete and elo-
quent ways) have made the claim that Legal Moralism is an in-
appropriate basis for criminal law interventions, most famously 
 
 222. E.g., Scott Altman, (Com)modifying Experience, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 
293, 294–97 (1991) (expressing a fear that markets may alter our sensibilities 
in a way that leads us to “regard each other as objects with prices rather than 
as persons”); Cohen, supra note 43, at 691–92 (discussing the possibility of 
corruption, that markets in some goods may do violence or denigrate our views 
of how those goods are properly valued). 
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H. L. A Hart in his debate with Lord Devlin223 and Joel Fein-
berg in his volume on Harmless Wrongdoing, which appears in 
his work on the Moral Limits of the Criminal Law.224 This is 
one of the truly great debates in legal theory—whether Legal 
Moralism has any place in a liberal polity and, if not, whether 
we ought to embrace the liberal state—a debate to which some 
of the greatest legal and philosophical thinkers have contribut-
ed.225 Given this intellectual firepower, I am modest enough to 
say I have little to add to this debate itself—one will either be 
convinced that Legal Moralism is an inappropriate basis for 
criminalizing conduct (and perhaps some other interventions) 
as I am,226 or not, and anything I can say in this short space will 
not convince you otherwise. 
Instead I see my contribution here as twofold. First, an 
unmasking one, to expose the potentially problematic bait and 
switch that is going on in much of the discourse about regulat-
ing reproductive technology, where Legal Moralist objections 
are clothed in the guise of a BIRC argument aimed at protect-
ing society’s most vulnerable. I suspect that many BIRC propo-
nents of these measures consider themselves good liberals and 
if forced to instead rely on illiberal Legal Moralist arguments 
(due to the incoherence of BIRC ones), would no longer support 
the interventions discussed. Further, in some cases including 
LGBT access to reproductive technologies, the BIRC-type justi-
fication is sometimes offered alongside an illiberal Legal Moral-
 
 223. See PATRICK DEVLIN, Morals and the Criminal Law, in THE EN-
FORCEMENT OF MORALS 1 (1965); H. L. A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 
60–61 (1963); see also COMM. ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, 
THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OF-
FENSES AND PROSTITUTION (1957) (debating the appropriateness of criminal 
sanctions for homosexual acts). 
 224. See FEINBERG, supra note 165, at 4–8. 
 225. For a glimpse of the great minds who have engaged this question, see 
MILL, supra note 13, at 9; JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, 
FRATERNITY 135–37 (R.J. White ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1873); 
Ronald Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 
986, 986–87 (1966); Robert P. George, Social Cohesion and the Legal Enforce-
ment of Morals: A Reconsideration of the Hart-Devlin Debate, 35 AM. J. JURIS. 
15, 19 (1990); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Liberalism, 37 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 73, 76 (1995). For a truly excellent recent history and historiography of 
this debate, see Harcourt, supra note 109, at 113–16. 
 226. Feinberg himself suggests that harmless immoralities might properly 
be targeted through subsidies or educational programs that promote a particu-
lar vision of the good life, so long as criminal prohibition is avoided. See 
FEINBERG, supra note 165, at 312–13. 
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ist condemnation of the lifestyle, but my analysis shows the 
BIRC strand adds nothing except obfuscation.  
Second, from a U.S. constitutional law perspective, expos-
ing what is styled as a BIRC justification as an illiberal form of 
Legal Moralism is important because of increasing indications 
that the latter is a constitutionally impermissible form of justi-
fication. In Lawrence v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court invali-
dated a statute criminalizing same-sex sodomy, and in doing so, 
the Court in large part relied on Justice Stevens’ dissent from 
Bowers v. Hardwick, in particular his claim that “‘the fact that 
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a 
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for up-
holding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tra-
dition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from consti-
tutional attack.’”227 A number of authors have taken this as a 
rejection of the constitutional sufficiency of Legal Moralism as 
a justification for the criminalization of conduct.228 If they are 
right, and the interventions discussed in Part I (and even then 
only a subset of them) can only be justified on Legal Moralist 
grounds, they appear to be constitutionally suspect. Of course, 
it is also possible that reports of the constitutional death of Le-
gal Moralism are greatly exaggerated.229  
 
 227. 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 
216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  
 228. E.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: “You Are Entering a Gay and 
Lesbian Free Zone”: On The Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other 
(Post-) Queers, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503, 503–04 (2004) (“Lawrence 
v. Texas, will go down in history as a critical turning point in criminal law de-
bates over the proper scope of the penal sanction. For the first time in the his-
tory of American criminal law, the United States Supreme Court has declared 
that a supermajoritarian moral belief does not necessarily provide a rational 
basis for criminalizing conventionally deviant conduct. The Court’s ruling is 
the coup de grâce to legal moralism administered after a prolonged, brutish, 
tedious, and debilitating struggle against liberal legalism in its various crimi-
nal law representations.”); see also Donald L. Beschle, Lawrence Beyond Gay 
Rights: Taking the Rationality Requirement for Justifying Criminal Statutes 
Seriously, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 231, 262 (2005); Nan D. Hunter, Living with 
Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1106 (2004); Eric A. Johnson, Habit and 
Discernment in Abortion Practice: The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act Of 2003 
as Morals Legislation, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 549, 604 (2005). 
 229. Indeed, Justice Kennedy (who authored Lawrence and would be a cru-
cial vote in its extension) dissented in Stenberg v. Carhart a mere three years 
before Lawrence, regarding Nebraska’s partial-birth abortion statute, and re-
lied on Legal Moralistic ideas (or at least ideas very close to it) to justify crim-
inalizing partial birth abortions but not others, suggesting his rejection of Le-
gal Moralism may be fickle. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 963 (2000) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“D & X’s stronger resemblance to infanticide means 
Nebraska could conclude the procedure presents a greater risk of disrespect 
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As I have done several times throughout this Article, I here 
want to emphasize that not all of the means of influencing the 
target decision are equal. In particular, some of the means oth-
er than criminal law regulation may escape this constitutional 
problem. To wit, in Harris v. McRae, the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld Congressional restrictions on abortion funding notwith-
standing its rejection of the criminalization of those same abor-
tions in Roe v. Wade, invoking arguments very close to Legal 
Moralism.230 If Harris remains good law after Lawrence, as it 
appears to, then there is arguably room (as a constitutional 
matter) for Legal Moralism in the State’s decision as to what to 
fund, one of the possible means for influencing the target deci-
sion already discussed. Thus, subject to a possible Equal Pro-
tection type challenge or a charge of pure animus,231 Legal Mor-
alism may permit the state to refuse to fund lesbian, gay, or 
single persons’ use of reproductive technology (directly or 
through insurance mandates) while funding that of heterosex-
ual married couples, even though it could not make the same 
distinctions through its criminal law. It is less certain whether 
Legal Moralism remains constitutionally alive and well as a 
justification for means of regulating reproduction falling be-
tween funding and criminalization—for example, whether one 
can punish a lifestyle through the regulation of parental status, 
or through tort law. 
B. VIRTUE ETHICS 
A different kind of response to the Non-Identity Problem is 
drawn from a broad Virtue Ethics tradition. This tradition sug-
gests that an action is right if the action is one that a virtuous 
moral agent would characteristically perform under the cir-
cumstances.232 In The Case Against Perfection, Michael J. 
Sandel offers a Virtue Ethics style argument against enhance-
ment focusing on the parental virtues.233 For Sandel, the prob-
lem with enhancement “lies in the hubris of the designing par-
 
for life and a consequent greater risk to the profession and society, which de-
pend for their sustenance upon reciprocal recognition of dignity and respect.”). 
 230. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980). 
 231. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 232. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 65–
76 (2006); Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta et al. eds., rev. July 18, 2007), http://plato.stanford 
.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/. 
 233. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION: ETHICS IN 
THE AGE OF GENETIC ENGINEERING 45–56 (2007). 
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ents, in their drive to master the mystery of birth . . . [because] 
it disfigures the relation between parent and child, and de-
prives the parent of the humility and enlarged human sympa-
thies that an openness to the unbidden can cultivate.”234  
Can the regulations of reproduction discussed above be de-
fended along similar lines, as attempts to inculcate these pa-
rental virtues? The Non-Identity Problem poses no obstacle for 
an argument along the lines offered by Sandel. For him, like 
many in the Virtue Ethics camp, the character of the agent do-
ing the action is what is central in determining its wrongful-
ness.235 Thus, for Sandel, it appears that the practice of en-
hancement is wrong even if we grant that a given enhancement 
benefits the resulting child because the parents engaging in 
enhancement are acting in a way contrary to the parental vir-
tues.236 Because the Non-Identity Problem’s power stems from 
demonstrating the lack of harm to the child, it is powerless 
against this kind of argument, which does not depend on mak-
ing a claim of harm to the child. 
However, extending the argument into our context seems 
problematic: to the extent the problem with the forms of repro-
duction at issue here is that they are thought to produce defi-
cits in the children that they produce (as against the hypothet-
ical normal child), it is not these parents that evince an 
inappropriate lack of openness to the unbidden—they very 
much are willing to accept the child that results—rather it is 
the State that is evincing that attitude and seeks to interfere.237  
That may just mean that Sandel’s brand of parental virtue 
is not a good fit for this context or must be supplemented with 
another conception. In offering her own Virtue Ethics approach 
to sex selection, Rosalind McDougall suggests that even if 
“[b]ecoming a parent is . . . partly and justifiably a self directed 
project,” the fact remains that “the primary purpose of a parent 
 
 234. Id. at 46. 
 235. See Solum, supra note 232; Hursthouse, supra note 232. 
 236. See SANDEL, supra note 233, at 1–4, 11–19, 94–97 (emphasizing that 
his argument is distinct from arguments against enhancement relating to 
safety, autonomy, or distribution of benefits). 
 237. To be fair, the users of reproductive technologies as a whole are not 
easily characterized as a population more “open to the unbidden,” in that trait 
selection of sperm and egg donors as well as surrogates is rife in the industry. 
See e.g., id. at 1–4 (offering several compelling examples of trait selection of 
sperm and egg donors). My point, instead, is that the kinds of reproductive de-
cisions targeted by the state, discussed above, cannot be easily condemned on 
Sandel’s approach because these parents do not evince these attitudes he finds  
inappropriate.  
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is the flourishing of his or her child,” and thus there “seems to 
be something unparental about an agent who creates a child 
with no chance of flourishing, purely to satisfy his or her own 
desire to have a child.”238  
Might we say that the parents in our cases act 
“unparentally” by “creat[ing] a child with no chance of flourish-
ing, purely to satisfy his or her own desire to have a child”?239 
Notice that the strong way McDougall puts her criteria, chil-
dren with “no chance of flourishing,” seems to rule out many of 
our cases. Even if we assume arguendo that in our cases the re-
sulting children—those raised by a single parent, a teenage 
mother, gay parents, not knowing one’s genetic father, etc.—
have a lesser chance of flourishing, it is hard to say they have 
zero chance of flourishing.  
The deeper question, though, is whether a Virtue Ethics 
approach centered on the child’s flourishing can really sidestep 
the Non-Identity Problem in the way McDougall suggests.240 I 
would argue that it is just as apt a description of the parental 
virtue to say parents should try as hard as possible to prevent 
serious harm to (or confer benefits on) their children, while ac-
cepting the child they have—like Sandel, McDougall emphasiz-
es acceptance “[b]ecause a child’s characteristics are unpredict-
able” and “[t]he flourishing of the child is facilitated by the 
parent’s embracing of the child regardless of his or her specific 
characteristics.”241 The parents who would be subject to regula-
tion in our cases (those who want to be single, gay, or teenage 
parents, etc.) are acting consonant with these virtues. They ac-
cept the children that this regulation would seek to prevent 
coming into being as they are, and the parents do not harm this 
child (or fail to confer benefit on it) for the exact reasons sug-
gested by the Non-Identity Problem. While I have focused on 
the way the Non-Identity Problem renders harm to resulting 
child arguments problematic, it has a symmetrical effect on 
benefit to resulting child arguments. Put another way, it may 
be that any view tying the wrongfulness of reproductive action 
to the flourishing of the resulting child depends on some notion 
of harm and benefit to a child, which is rendered problematic 
by the Non-Identity Problem. 
 
 238. R. McDougall, Acting Unparentally: An Argument Against Sex Selec-
tion, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 601, 603 (2005). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 602. 
 241. Id. at 603. 
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Even if I am wrong, and there is an account of parental vir-
tue in which the types of regulation we have been discussing 
can be said to target unparental action, there are further diffi-
culties. First, there is a general difficulty for Virtue Ethics. To 
the extent individuals propose clashing conceptions of parental 
only some of which render these acts of regulation problematic, 
how can we resolve these disagreements? Second, can this cri-
tique successfully form the basis of legal regulation rather than 
merely serve as a marker for moral wrongfulness? Virtue ethics 
is enjoying something of a renaissance in American legal cir-
cles.242 In criminal law, specifically, a minority view has 
emerged that suggests that concern for the character of the 
perpetrator is a central aspect of criminal law,243 and there are 
certainly categories of crimes (vice crimes such as gambling 
and prostitution, for example) where the focus on character 
seems still closer to the surface. Can the State use criminal law 
to encourage and inculcate virtue in the would-be perpetrator, 
even when the act that is criminalized is not at all harmful? 
That is a big question, and one I do not purport to resolve here, 
except to note that there may be concerns with marshalling 
criminal law interventions here even if we thought there was a 
good account of inappropriate parental virtues, and that Virtue 
Ethics was an appropriate moral theory to guide political deci-
sion making.244 
 
 242. Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory 
of Judging, 34 METAPHIL. 178, 180–81 (2003) (reviewing articles applying Vir-
tue Ethics to, inter alia, antitrust, civil rights, corporate, criminal, employment, 
and environmental law, as well as offering a Virtue Ethics take on judging). 
 243. See Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 
1423–44 (1995); see also Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal 
Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 364 (2004) (“In judging criminal conduct, virtue 
ethics judges the defendant’s exercise of practical judgment, and thereby his 
character.”). 
 244. Among the complications is that while the virtueless action may be 
harmless in our cases (due to Non-Identity Problem reasons), unless the char-
acter of the parent is reformed by deployment of the law, that same character 
may actually yield activities contrary to human flourishing in other contexts 
where harm is possible. 
There is also an open question of whether a Virtue Ethics justification is 
constitutionally appropriate for criminal law interventions after Lawrence. 
Some passages in that opinion seem to inter only Legal Moralism, while others 
seem to reach further. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–58 
(2003), with id. at 571. As far as I know, there has been no discussion of this 
issue among Virtue Ethics legal scholars or constitutional ones. As I noted ear-
lier, see sources cited supra note 161, if strict scrutiny applies, these regula-
tions will also face separate over- and underinclusivity problems. 
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For these reasons, the Legal Moralist and Virtue Ethics 
approaches seems unpromising as justifications for the regula-
tion of reproduction. 
  CONCLUSION   
In this Article, and in this larger project, I have shown a 
deep tendency for courts, legislatures, and scholars to appeal to 
a particular kind of justification for interventions that influ-
ence reproduction: the Best Interests of the Resulting Child 
(BIRC). As to interventions that aim at altering when, whether, 
and with whom we reproduce, I have shown that the Non-
Identity Problem makes this form of justification problematic, 
an insight that courts have themselves recognized in the 
wrongful life category. Nevertheless, I have suggested that ap-
peals to BIRC reasoning remain pervasive both because of an 
unthinking transposition of an idea from family law, and be-
cause of the political theory advantages of adopting a Millian 
Harm Principle approach focused on vulnerable populations. 
I have also considered several other substitute forms of 
justification that could potentially do the work of the BIRC ar-
gument: Reproductive Externalities, Wronging while Overall 
Benefiting, Legal Moralism, and Virtue Ethics. For each, I have 
suggested reasons why these approaches are unappealing as 
criteria for moral wrongfulness and also expressed some skep-
ticism as to their suitability as justifications for legal interven-
tion, especially interventions that restrict liberty in serious 
ways, such as criminalization. These facts, I believe, also par-
tially account for the persistence of the BIRC argument in the 
examples I have canvassed despite its rejection as to wrongful 
life liability: it allows us to avoid confrontation with these un-
pleasant implications. 
Where does this leave the regulation of reproduction? Of 
the approaches I have outlined in this Article the Reproductive 
Externalities approach seems to me the most plausible way 
forward, though it may only be the best of a bad lot. Intriguing-
ly, especially among bioethicists, it is the justification for regu-
lating reproduction most seldom defended. My accounts of its 
infirmities (limitations to same-number cases, internalizing the 
externality, attenuation of harms, etc) and disturbing implica-
tions (eugenics, enhancement) may explain why this is the 
case. If we were forced openly to talk about Reproductive Ex-
ternalities rather than BIRC, I think we would settle on a 
much smaller swath of such regulation. In particular, we would 
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regulate only in cases where same-number substitutions were 
likely, when externalities were net negative, when the net neg-
ative externalities were large, when we could not plausibly de-
rive a scheme by which individuals internalize their externali-
ties, and when the means of influencing the target reproductive 
decision are less liberty-limiting. As discussed above, I think 
only the regulation of adult brother-sister incest and abstinence 
education funding are plausible candidates for regulation based 
on this framework, and even then I have my doubts.  
This is a tentative assessment. My goal in this project has 
not been to offer fine-grained assessments of particular repro-
ductive regulations; instead, I have aimed to fundamentally re-
write the way we talk and think about regulating reproduction. 
I hope that never again will policymakers, courts, and legisla-
tures defend the regulation of reproduction on grounds of chil-
dren’s best interest or child welfare, and instead recognize the 
complex and unpleasant questions that locution camouflages. 
While I have focused on a few particular regulations of repro-
duction, the lessons from this Article and the greater project 
are also applicable to a much greater swath of reproductive ac-
tivity, including cloning, chimeras, and other technologies still 
further on the horizon.  
